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An Open Access Distribution Tariff: 
Removing Barriers to Innovation 
on the Smart Grid 
Joel B. Eisen 
ABSTRACT 
This Article proposes that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 
consider promulgating an Open Access Distribution Tariff (OADT) to open the 
nation's electric grid to new products and services at the consumer (distribution) level. 
Design of the OADT would be comparable to the Open Access Transmission Tariff 
that the FERC has used previously to open the nation's transmission wires. This 
Article argues that an OADT is necessary to create a smart electricity network that 
would be national, multimodal, and interactive. There is no smart electricity network 
at present, and there are numerous barriers to the development of open networking, 
such as obstacles to open access, lack of consumer demand for such a network and 
its products, resistance of incumbent utilities, and a variety of other factors. An open 
access principle will likely be necessary, but the timing of such regulation is of critical 
importance. This Article argues that regulatory establishment of an open access principle 
will eventually be necessary-and to assess when open access might be desirable, this 
Article examines the revolutionary transformations that took place in three regulated 
industries: telecommunications, electricity restructuring, and finance. 
This Article examines key near-term and long-term questions involving an OADT's 
timing and development by analyzing these regulated industries using three criteria: 
(1) signifiers of when a transition would be necessary and conditions that might make 
open access more desirable to industry actors, (2) regulatory prerequisites necessary in 
the near term, and (3) risks involved in drawing lessons from the specific regulatory 
transformation (including federalism concerns). This Article concludes that rather 
than waiting for an organic transformation of the electric grid and evolution of open 
networking, a deliberate path of preparatory work will best set the foundation for 
open access. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Hardly a day goes by without some call for transformative regulatory 
change to the U.S. electric grid to promote the development and deployment 
of revolutionary technologies.1 This Article introduces and discusses a means 
of accelerating that transformation, an open access distribution tariff 
(OADT). As the name suggests, the OADT would be implemented by a 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) rule,2 modeled upon 
FERC's Order 888, which provided the foundation for opening the nation's 
transmission grid and spurring electric industry restructuring.3 The purpose 
of the OADT would be to create a smart electricity network4 that would replace 
the current linear model of delivering electricity. This smart electricity network 
would feature a multimodal grid with supply, demand, and network man-
agement all taking place at multiple nodes on the network5 and transactive 
energy (multi-directional transactions taking place in the system).6 In today's 
electric grid, this would involve access to existing distribution wires, unless 
1. See, e.g., Davide Savenije, Ron Binz Predicts 3 Changes Coming to Utility Regulation, UTILI1Y DIVE 
(Oct. 18, 2013), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/ron-binz-predicts-3-changes-corning-to-utility-
regulation/183326. Ron Binz, former Chairman of the Colorado Public Utilities Commission and 
unsuccessful choice for Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Chairman, states that "[i]t's 
very clear that U.S. regulation needs an overhaul in a very fundamental way." Id 
2. A FERC Order requiring utilities to adopt open access distribution tariffs (OADTs) would raise 
obvious jurisdictional issues. See discussion infra Part III. 
3. See Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission 
Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 
61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (Apr. 24, 1996) [hereinafter FERC Order 888], available at http://www. 
ferc.gov/legal/maj-ord-reg/land-docs/rm95-8-00w.txt (to be codified at 18 C.F.R pts. 35, 385). 
4. While the term "Smart Grid" has arisen to describe the concepts, technologies, and operating 
practices that may revolutionize the staid electric grid and redefine electricity generation, 
distribution, and use, this Article prefers the term "smart electricity network'' to highlight a 
central attribute of this transformation and aim of the OADT: multidirectional networking. 
See, e.g.,Joel B. Eisen, Smart Regulation and Federalism for the Smart Grid, 37 HARV. ENVTL. 
L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2013). 
5. DAVE GROSSMAN, AsPEN INST., ADVANCING SMART ELECTRICI1YNETWORKS 1-2 (2013) 
[hereinafter AsPEN INST.], available at http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/ 
images/INSENT%202013%20Report:%20FINAL.pdf("[A J smart electricity network, in contrast, 
has supply, demand and network management happening everywhere. End use, for example, 
can be not only a source of demand but also a source of supply (e.g., rooftop solar)."). 
6. See Transactive Energy, GRIDWISEAC, http://www.gridwiseac.org/aboutltransactive_ energy.aspx 
(last updated Feb. 2014). For a perspective critical of the term "transactive energy," see Michael T. 
Burr, Who's Afraid of the Transactive Grid?, PuB. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 2013, at 4 (calling the 
term a "buzzword'' and an unnecessary shorthand for describing ongoing developments on the grid). 
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storage or some other nonwire solution displaces them.7 A smart electricity 
network would most likely be layered on top of the existing one without phys-
ically displacing it. 
The central aim of the OADT would be to make this network open and 
freely accessible for purchases and sales of electricity. Under the FERC Order, 
public utilities that FERC regulates would be required to file tariffs to open 
their electric distribution lines to all purchasers and sellers of electricity, and 
all providers of energy services. Utilities would be required to offer the same 
terms, rates, and conditions to all users, effectively imposing a common carri-
er obligation on distribution line owners. The Order would create a system 
providing transparent and readily accessible information and would preempt 
state laws hindering network transactions. The implications are staggering. 
Under an OADT, for example, an individual homeowner with solar panels 
could sell excess electricity freely to a resident of another state, or sell it into 
the regional wholesale electricity markets now existing in roughly half the nation. 
As this brief introduction suggests, the idea of an OADT is radically 
new and complex, with many variables that would need further definition. 
For example, "open access" is not self-defining,8 and FERC would need to 
make a number of difficult decisions about the terms and conditions of access. 
Currently, there is no consensus about the network architecture or objectives 
that a smart electricity network would promote. The possibility even exists 
that today's Smart Grid9 may become part of a broader Internet ofThings.10 
For purposes of discussion, this Article assumes this is a realistic possibility, 
but it also recognizes that ongoing initiatives to build toward a Smart Grid 
will continue and discussing an open access principle for the Smart Grid is 
important. 
7. See Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Decision Adopting Energy Storage Procurement Framework 
and Design Program, R.10-12-007 (proposed Oct. 17, 2013) (adopting a framework for 
energy storage procurement in California and calling for 1,325 MW of storage capacity for the 
three major investor-owned utilities in California by 2020 pursuant to CAL. PUB. UTIL. 
CODE § 2836 (West 2013)). For a discussion of federal regulation of energy storage and 
prospects for further expansion, see Amy L. Stein, Reconsidering Regulatory Uncertainty: A 
Path Forward for Energy Storage, 4 l FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript on 
file with author). 
8. See, e.g., Agustin Diaz-Pines, Stimulating Competition Through Open Access Networks, OECD 
INSIGHTS (Mar. 5, 2013), http://oecdinsights.org/2013/03/05/stimulating-competition-through-
open-access-networks. 
9. See, e.g., Eisen, supra note 4, at 1-2. 
10. See Emily Adler, Here's U'hy The Internet if Things' Will Be Huge, and Drive Tremendous Value for People 
and Businesses, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 7, 2013, 9:38 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/growth-in-
the-internet-of-things-2013-10 (including "Smart electricity grids" as one part of the evolving 
network). 
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According to one recent definition, a smart electricity network is "an 
open-access, multi-directional transactional platform that enables optimiza-
tion of a range of objectives .... includ[ing] not only those objectives that are 
the foundation of the current electricity system (providing universal, afforda-
ble, reliable, and safe power), but also new objectives such as enabling clean 
power, distributed generation, consumer choice, and innovation."11 That 
long-and at times inherently contradictory-list illustrates that the net-
work's eventual character is yet to be defined in any meaningful way. 
While the promise of a smart electricity network is great, there are nu-
merous obstacles to its innovation. One formidable barrier is the ongoing 
federal-state tension in electricity regulation. For many issues relating to the 
smart electricity network, "decisions have to be made about the level of gov-
ernment at which regulation should occur and the model for cooperation (or 
lack thereof) between the different levels of government."12 In one early court 
battle over the distribution of regulatory jurisdiction, a D.C. Circuit panel 
held that FERC could not use its authority over wholesale electricity markets 
to require market pricing of a resource offered into those markets (blocks of 
demand response, involving aggregated reductions of electricity consumption 
in response to incentives), although there may be a different outcome on rehear-
ing. Other challenges to new FERC rules are pending. 
Another challenging barrier to open access is the control of distribution 
wires by incumbent utilities. In some states, utilities have fought programs 
that might lead to smart electricity networking, such as expanded net meter-
ing that allows consumers to sell excess power to the electric grid. Still another 
obstacle is the lack of consumer demand for a smart electricity network and its 
products and services. Given the dearth of plug-and-play products, services, 
and business models, development of a smart electricity network is unlikely to 
be consumer-driven. This means that unless some entity or entities builds 
network infrastructure to prompt consumer demand (and therefore, at least at 
the start, with some speculation as to what might do this), the potential bene-
fits such as consumer choice and cleaner generation are unlikely to materialize. 
Overcoming these barriers requires both new technologies and trans-
formative regulatory change. Development of a smart electricity network will 
occur in part through natural evolutionary change. Federal and state govern-
ments already encourage the development and deployment of new potentially 
disruptive technologies in the electricity sector. Moreover, some commenta-
11. ASPEN INST., supra note 5, at v. 
12. Id. at 13. 
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tors have noted that establishing key high-level standards, frameworks, and 
related principles can help direct network development.13 The central ques-
tion for the smart electricity network is whether we will still need more regu-
latory intervention. 
This Article argues that a regulatory open access principle will eventually 
be necessary. Part I concludes that the current grid, even with the changes 
currently envisioned, is far from a national, multimodal network and does not 
yet incorporate interactive strategies, opportunities, and business models for 
electricity generation, use, and management. Part I also examines the problem of 
the current low consumer demand for interactive applications and concludes 
that a network must evolve in the absence of strong demand. 
Such a claim invites a central question: Under what conditions, and 
when should we establish a principle of openness? If the network would happen 
without further intervention by the accretion of laws and policies favoring 
technologies at the edge of the grid over the coming years, an OADT would 
not be needed. Part II challenges that assumption, and argues that an OADT 
would facilitate a transition to networking by overcoming resistance on the 
part of incumbent utilities. 
To focus more closely on the timing and conditions of the transfor-
mation to openness, Part III examines three examples of dramatic change and 
regulatory transformation in different industries: telecommunications, elec-
tricity restructuring, and finance following the financial meltdown of the 
Great Recession. No one example will yield a precise prediction of exactly 
how we'll evolve toward a smart electricity network. But these dramatic 
transformations taken together have much predictive guidance to offer. 
The Article argues that proponents of a smart electricity network can 
learn many useful lessons from these examples about two specific parameters: 
(1) signifiers that would help policymakers determine when the transfor-
mation to open access is appropriate (and conditions that might make open 
access more desirable to industry actors), and (2) regulatory prerequisites nec-
essary in the near term (given that open access is proposed for some future 
date). In addition, the discussion of each example analyzes risks involved in 
relying on any one particular combination of timing and regulatory transfor-
mation, including federalism concerns. 
Part III illustrates how each of these parameters and risks operated in 
the three examples and suggests key near-term and long-term questions sur-
rounding an OADT's timing and development. For the financial systems 
13. See, e.g., Eisen, supra note 4, at 3-4. 
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model, Part III discusses important lessons we can learn from financial reform, 
which did not result in open access on a network, in place of the two parame-
ters. The analysis in Part III suggests key near- and long-term questions for 
an OADT's timing and development. The Article concludes by outlining the 
necessary prerequisites for, and barriers to, fundamental transformation of the 
electric utility industry. 
I. THE SMART ELECTRICITYNETWORKAND OPEN ACCESS 
A. Where We Are Today: No Network, but Lots of Promise 
At present, we have no smart electricity network. Network designers of-
ten make a distinction between network infrastructure and applications that 
take advantage of that infrastructure.14 We currently have neither. Instead, 
we have an existing infrastructure without network capabilities and with sub-
stantial barriers to open networking, including the presence of monopoly 
owners at a critical bottleneck (the distribution lines). This is the opposite of 
a network. Call it a non-network. 
As multiple observers have noted, the electric grid is not smart.15 The 
U.S. electric grid is an engineering marvel that reliably provides universal, af-
fordable, reliable, and safe electricity. No one would seriously contend that it 
is technically flawed, notwithstanding its occasional large-scale brownouts 
and other failures. 16 Yet the grid is largely stuck in the twentieth century. 
Today's infrastructure is predominantly "linear, with one-directional flow 
from generation (supply) to transmission and distribution (network manage-
ment) to end use (demand)."17 
For the moment, there is no network, but seeds of revolutionary tech-
nologies are everywhere. Many of these, including distributed generation, 
plug-in electric vehicles, demand response, energy efficiency, and microgrids, 
could take advantage of a network if one were available, especially if support-
ed by aggressive governmental policies such as renewable portfolio stand-
14. See CISCO SYS., NETWORK AND APPLICATION MANAGEMENT MADE SIMPLER 1 (2012), 
www.cisco.com/web/ solutions/ median et/ docs/whitepaper_ cl 1-698465 _ v2. pdf. 
15. Cf MAss. INST. OF TECH. ENERGY INITIATIVE, THE FlJIURE OF THE ELECTRIC GRID 1-3 
(2011), available at http:! /mitei.mit.edu/systern/files/Electric_ Grid_Full_Report.pdf (discussing 
the limitations of today's electric grid). 
16. See generally id;J. MICHAEL BARRETT ET AL., LEXINGTON INST., ENSURING THE RESILIENCE 
OF THE U.S. ELECTRICAL GRID 5-6 (2013), http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org!library/resources/ 
documents/Energy/EnsuringResilienceofUSElectricalGrid pdf (discussing the electric grid's 
resilience and the risk of system wide failures). 
17. ASPEN INST., supra note 5, at 3. 
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ards.18 Which technologies on the "edge" of the grid will emerge as potential 
large-scale competition to incumbent utilities? That is not clear. 
Nor, for that matter, is another critical aspect of the network clear: 
whether developers of new energy resources would even seek to use it. The 
disruptive character of many energy applications on the grid's edge is their 
ability to replace electricity provided by utilities. Producers could add genera-
tion capacity or demand response to the grid, but they might also detach 
themselves from the grid altogether and create independence from utilities by 
self-generating or pursuing strategies to curb demand.19 
Discussions of developing electricity resources at the edge of the grid often 
conflate these two possibilities, as in the case of microgrids, which could be 
independent islands or connected to the grid.20 Much of the contemporary 
discussion about developing alternatives to traditional utilities does not presuppose 
a specific form for the network to which these new resources might connect. 
Yet that is obviously important to know. If producers intend to provide elec-
tricity to others across the network, they would encounter problems with the 
distribution system. To use an interstate highway analogy, it is impossible to 
decide whether all are entitled to use the highway if private companies control 
the entrance ramps. 
The potential connections on the network could take a variety of forms, 
including nonlinear ones. What seems settled is that the network is not likely 
to be a full-blown new infrastructure, but rather will consist of improvements 
to the old infrastructure, such as deployment of smart meters and digital 
technology across the existing network. We must acknowledge, however, 
that at some point it might be technically possible to develop a completely 
new network, such as wireless transmission, if the technology advances 
enough.21 
18. See, e.g., Most States Have Renewable PartfolioStandards, U.S. ENERGYINFO.ADMIN. (Feb. 3, 2012), 
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=4850; DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR 
RENEWABLES AND EFFICIENCY, RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARD POLICIES, 
http://www.dsireusa.org/docurnents/surmnarymaps/RPS_map.pdf (last visited Sept. 13, 2013) 
(discussing and mapping state RPSs). 
19. See, e.g., Rebecca Smith &Cassandra Sweet, Companies Unplug From the Electric Grid, Delivering a jolt 
to Utilities, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 17, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001 
424127887324906304579036721930972500. 
20. See Justin Gerdes, How Microgrids are Bolstering the Nation's Power Inftastructure, SMITHSONIAN 
(Nov. 15, 2013), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-naturelhow-microgrids-are-bolstering-
the-nations-power-infrastructure-180947705. See generally Sara C. Branin, Curbing Energy Sprawl 
With Microgrids, 43 CONN. L. REV. 547 (2010). 
21. See Brian Dumaine, Electric Power Without Lines, CNN MONEY (Nov. 1, 2013, 9:21 AM), 
http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2013/11/01/wireless-electricit:y (describing companies that are 
investing in development of the technology). 
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Defining a smart electricity network introduces circularity into the dis-
cussion. What is smart can mean many things to many people, encompassing 
a wide range of functions, goals, and attributes. Does a smart electricity network 
operate like the Internet, with fast, digital connections everywhere? Does it 
have improved operational efficiencies, such as faster outage and restoration 
capabilities, and better ability to manage volatile supply and demand condi-
tions? Is it secure? Reliable? Private? Is it cleaner than today's grid, with 
more renewable energy, demand response, and energy efficiency? That last 
objective might be a paramount goal for some, particularly those concerned 
about the climate change impacts of electricity generation. For those actors, 
we should design the network explicitly with that goal front and center.22 
To enumerate this list of objectives is to observe that many of them are 
contradictory. It is not self-evident, for example, that a more rapid and relia-
ble network would necessarily be cleaner. A more efficient network could 
predominantly rely on fossil fuels, especially natural gas, given the rapid increase in 
its availability at low prices, its displacement of coal in the generation mix, 
and the ease with which newer plants can ramp up to meet surges in demand. 23 
To sum up, there is little to no common understanding about three dis-
tinct questions: what form the network infrastructure will take24; what multi-
directional connections the network makes possible; and what goals are being 
pursued (such as more clean energy, more support for disruptive innovations, 
and so forth). The multiplicity of decision makers, including federal regula-
tory agencies, state public utility commissions (PUCs), utilities, regional 
transmission grid operators, and others, virtually guarantees that this conver-
sation will be years in the making. Furthermore, as the dialogue is proceed-
ing, there is tremendous dissonance. It is extraordinarily difficult to separate 
out "what the network is from how we would like it to operate and why we are 
. . "25 pursumg 1t .... 
22. See, e.g., Elias L. Qiinn &Adam L. Reed, Envisioning the Smart Grid: Network Architecture, 
Information Control, and the Public Policy Balancing Act, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 833, 834-39 
(2010); Steven Ferrey, Restructuring a Green Grid: Legal Challenges to Accommodate New 
Renewable Energy Infrastructure, 39 ENVTL. L. 977 (2009). 
23. See Wendy Koch, US. Forecasts Natural Gas Boom Through 2040, USA TODAY (Dec. 16, 
2013, 10:56 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/12/16/doe-forecast-
natural-gas-boom/4034723. 
24. The development of interoperability standards is beginning to provide a technical foundation. 
See Eisen, supra note 4, at 23-26. 
25. ASPEN INST., supra note 5, at 2; see also Qiinn & Reed, supra note 22, at 839 ("Many 
decisions regarding [smart grid's] network architecture-the actors, physical means, and legal 
entitlements by which data is collected, aggregated, analyzed, utilized, provided, or sold to 
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Yet even amidst this near-term uncertainty, a gradual consensus of sorts 
is developing. First, technologies either being deployed today or envisioned 
for the near future are shifting the locus of electricity production toward the 
edge of the grid.26 Second, these technologies are potentially disruptive to the 
existing utility business model.27 Third, while resources are not yet coordi-
nated on a network, they hold the promise of change to the one-way system, 
possibly leading to a fully multidirectional network.28 Finally, our notion of 
"the way energy is sold, purchased, and used [may] fundamentally change" 
with a "dematerialization" similar to that taking place in the music industry, 
marked by "a shift from providing a commodity to providing a service."29 
B. The Challenge of Consumer Demand 
How could a smart electricity network benefit consumers? Many ob-
servers believe that consumers would have numerous new choices in terms of 
service, responsiveness, and applications that would yield environmental and 
economic benefits.30 To name just a few potential applications, providing 
consumers with fine-grained data on electricity usage could help them understand 
how much electricity they use, which in turn could prompt reduced consump-
tion and environmental benefits.31 The data gathered by smart meters may 
well "create a 'big data' ecosystem in which analytics will be essential for de-
vising products and services for which consumers might be willing to pay."32 
Specific services and programs, such as sophisticated energy management sys-
interested parties (be they consumers, utilities, data brokers, or others )-are not yet 
standardized, and in many cases these decisions are almost entirely unformed."). 
26. See BRACKEN HENDRICKS & ADAM SHEPARD JAMES, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE 
NETWORKED ENERGY WEB: THE CONVERGENCE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY, SMART 
GRID, AND DISTRIBUTED POWER GENERATION AS THE NEXT FRONTIER OF THE ICT 
REVOLlITION 5-6 (2012), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2012/08/0709 _ CleanEnergyWebl.pdf. 
27. PETER KIND, DISRUPTIVE CHALLENGES: FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND STRATEGIC 
RESPONSES TO A CHANGING RETAIL ELECTRIC BUSINESS 19 (2013), http://www.eei.org/ 
ourissues/finance/Documents/ disruptivechallenges. pd£ 
28. HENDRICKS & JAMES, supra note 26, at 6 (''[W]here electricity generation, transmission, and 
distribution, and consumer end use were once entirely distinct segments of the electricity grid, 
all nodes of the emerging networked energy web are increasingly more tightly interconnected, 
with producers, consumers, and grid operators all playing greater roles in optimizing supply, 
demand, and grid operations."). 
29. ASPEN INST., supra note 5, at 3. 
30. Inst. ofElec. and Electronics Eng'rs, Smart Grid Consumer Benif,ts, IEEE SMART GRID (Sept. 4, 
2013), http://smartgrid.ieee.org/ questions-and-answers/964-smart-grid-consumer-benefits. 
31. Id. 
32. ASPEN INST., supra note 5, at 4-5. 
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terns, could be developed for targeted customer groups or even for individual 
consumers. 33 
But this presents a classic chicken and egg situation. Consumer demand 
for the network is likely to be weak until the network infrastructure exists.34 
Those who might benefit from a smart electricity network-consumers-
have little to no knowledge about the concept35 and have demanded neither 
the network nor the products and services it would feature. Smart meters are 
just now being deployed widely and the components of the network are just 
emerging.36 Many observers have noted that even with increasing penetration 
of edge technologies such as distributed solar photovoltaic systems, there is 
still relatively low consumer demand for these products and services. As Reed 
Hundt, former chairman of the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC), noted, "[A]lmost no one wants to buy any of the outcomes of any 
[green] business models."37 But a recent report on state banks providing in-
centives for the financing of energy projects gives some cause for optimism.38 
In general, widespread availability of power purchase agreements, leases, 
feed-in tariffs,39 and other creative means of financing40 may prompt a dra-
matic increase in residential solar uptake. For now, however, solar still pro-
vides a small fraction of total generating capacity.41 
33. IEEE, supra note 30. 
34. ASPEN INST., supra note 5, at ix-x. 
35. Cf Most Consumers Feel They Only Moderately Understand How Smart Grid Technology Works, 
PR NEWSWIRE (Mar. 29, 2011), http://www.pmewswire.com/news-releases/most-consumers-
feel-they-only-moderately-understand-how-smart-grid-technology-works-118 8344 9 9 .html. 
36. ASPEN INST., supra note 5, at 6 ("Some isolated building blocks of the network infrastructure 
are already in place (e.g., neighborhood-scale solar, tri-gen plants), and there will be more 
incremental advancements that make the business case for a much bigger transformation."). 
37. Id at 5. 
38. See generally BRACKEN HENDRICKS &BEN BOVARNICK, CTR. FORAM. PROGRESS, BANKING 
ON CLEAN ENERGY: STATE LEADERSHIP IN FINANCING A GREENER FlJTURE (2014), 
available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2014/01/17 /82355/banking-on-
clean-energy-state-leadership-in-financing-a-greener-future-2 (noting that state green banks 
are becoming increasingly more successful at steering capital to renewable energy projects). 
39. See BOSSEIMAN, EISEN, ET AL., Renewable Energy Sources, ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND lliE 
ENVIRONMENT chs. 11-12 (4th ed., forthcoming 2014) for a comprehensive discussion of these 
incentives. 
40. The start-up firm Solar Mosaic, for example, uses crowdsourcing-aggregating investments from 
numerous investors to fund projects. See Ucilia Wang, Mosaic Plans Overseas Expansion U'ith Its 
Kickstarter-Style Solar Campaigns, FORBES (Jan. 8, 2014, 4:58 PM), http://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/uciliawang/2014/01/08/mosaic-plans-overseas-expansion-with-its-kickstarter-style-solar-
campaigns; SOLARMOSAIC, https://joinmosaic.com. 
41. See Annual Energy Outlook 2013: Market Trends-Electricity, U.S. ENERGY INFD. ADMIN., 
http://www.eia.gov/forecastslaeo/MT_electric.cfm (last visited Feb. 1, 2014) (noting that solar 
technologies combined account for less than five gigawatts of capacity nationwide). 
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There is also much that we do not know about consumer behavioral 
preferences with respect to electricity consumption. The literature on the 
subject is just now advancing to the point where researchers can monitor and 
understand the impact of changes in infrastructure, pricing, and applications 
on individual consumption. Until very recently, there has been little sophisti-
cated data, as smart meters have only lately become widely available. So we 
cannot yet know whether more widespread networking will require easy-to-
use devices and applications that handle sophisticated decisions-the electricity 
equivalent of smart phones-without a lot of consumer input.42 
Networking may also take new business models.43 We may need creative 
bundling of services or pricing options (such as the cellphone system's use of 
fixed prices for specific services or levels of usage). The existing situation "is ... 
very far from plug-and-play capability, where someone could go to the store, 
buy a little backyard vertical wind turbine, easily plug it into their electrical 
system, and have a panel in the home recognize and draw power from the new 
generation source."44 Without this simplicity of service and choice, we may 
not see widespread demand for a smart electricity network. 
Currently, then, the private sector will not establish a smart electricity 
network on its own, as individual firms have not built out the network infra-
structure. For that reason, the network is a public good that requires public 
investment before consumers want it and before open access principles are in 
place. The interoperability standards may well promote this goal. 45 
II. OPENACCESSTHROUGHANOADT: WHAT IS IT, AND UNDER 
WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES IS IT NECESSARY? 
This Part introduces the open access distribution tariff (OADT), a 
mechanism intended to more broadly spur the advancement of open 
networking, and makes the case for its necessity. 
42. See ASPEN INST., supra note 5, at 5. In a different context, see Shara Tibken, How Samsung 
Might Actually Get Featuritis Under Control, CNET (Mar. 15, 2013) (noting that "cramming 
unnecessary capabilities into products can make them confusing and difficult to use"). 
43. Joseph P. Tomain, Traditionally-Structured Electric Utilities in a Distributed Generation World, 
38 NOVA L. REV. 1, 3 (forthcoming 2014) (file with author) ("IOUs must change their 
business models in significant-if not dramatic-ways"). 
44. ASPEN INST., supra note 5, at 6. 
45. Eisen, supra note 4, at 21-24. 
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A. The Open Access Distribution Tariff 
The OADT would apply to the nation's electricity distribution system. 
"Distribution" is the final stage of moving electricity to consumers, which in-
cludes the local system oflow-voltage lines, substations and transformers, and 
operations that provide service (such as billing and outage restoration sys-
tems).46 The OADT would provide that any person or entity would have 
open access to the distribution grid to buy or sell power on the same terms as 
any other person or entity. It has an appealing analogue in FERC's Order 
888. That rule aimed to end the monopoly power of providers in the transmission 
network, which includes the high-voltage lines running from electricity gen-
erators to the distribution system, where electric companies then deliver it to 
consumers.47 Order 888 granted open access to the nation's transmission 
lines to all participants in the nation's wholesale power system on equal terms. 
Its specific terms required the nation's public utilities to file open access 
transmission tariffs (OA TTs), under which they must offer transmission ser-
vice on the same terms they provide themselves.48 Thus, it has resonance as a 
framework for defining the idea of open access to the distribution system. 
At a minimum, the OADT would have attributes comparable to those 
of the OA TT. First, it would establish a principle of open access to the smart 
electricity network. A justification for the OA TT was that "it is important 
that the non-traditional generators of cheaper power be able to gain access to 
the transmission grid on a non-discriminatory open access basis."49 One cen-
tral aspect of this (comparable to the Order 888 requirement that transmis-
sion providers create a level playing field for all resources) would be accurate 
price signaling and other terms, offered on a nondiscriminatory basis to all 
potential energy resource providers.50 Another aspect, intended to prevent 
undue discrimination, would be preemption of state efforts to preclude resources 
from entry to the network (such as onerous licensing requirements). 
46. How Electricity Is Delivered To Customers, U.S. ENERGYINFD. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/energy 
explained/index.cfm?page=electricity _delivery. 
47. Transmission, EDISON ELEC. INST., http://www.eei.org/issuesandpolicy/transmission/Pages/ 
default.aspx. 
48. FERC Order 888, supra note 3. This requirement is now codified in Non Discriminatory 
Open Access Transmission Tariff, 18 C.F.R § 35.28 (2013). 
49. FERC Order 888, supra note 3, at 21,550. 
50. FERC Order 888, supra note 3, at 21,596. 
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The OADT would also have a transparent information system, like the 
Open Access Same-Time Information System (OASIS) for transmission,51 
designed to enable all actors on the network to locate distributed resources 
readily and easily. It might also establish network regulatory capabilities, 
vesting them either in a new organization (as Order 888 did with Independent 
System Operators (ISOs)) or a preexisting one. Finally, it might provide for 
the distribution-level analogue of stranded costs,52 compensating wires and 
infrastructure providers (utilities) for their transformation from monopolists 
to common carriers. 53 
This framework is an introduction to extending Order 888's terms and 
logic to the distribution level, and as such, is only the beginning of the 
OADT development process. There are formidable design and preemption 
issues. If anyone anywhere could sell electricity to the grid, a large number of 
state and federal laws would have to change. For example, wholesale markets 
limit participation in markets for certain resources to participants of a certain 
size. The OADT would eliminate these limits. Reliability and frequency 
regulation would pose considerable challenges and the OADT would have to 
address them. An OADT would have to interact with, and potentially 
preempt state laws, such as laws granting monopoly franchises to incumbent 
utilities for sales to consumers within defined territories,54 net metering laws 
(which specify conditions under which consumers can make the electric meter 
51. The FERC established the Open Access Same-Time Information System (OASIS) in Open Access 
Same-Time Information System (Formerly Real-Time Information Networks) and Standards of 
Conduct, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,737 (Apr. 24, 1996) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 37). 
52. Stranded costs included utilities' investments in power plants and other expenses (such as costs 
of energy efficiency programs and fixed power supply contracts) that utilities made in a 
regulated environment, but which would be economically obsolete in the newly restructured 
environment by hampering their ability to compete with new power suppliers. William J. 
Baumol & J. Gregory Sidak, Stranded Costs, 18 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 835 (1995). 
Scholars made forceful arguments that utilities should recover these stranded costs due to 
sweeping changes in the nature of the regulatory bargain under which they had previously 
operated. See, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and Breach ef 
the Regulatory Contract, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 851 (1996). Others disagreed. See, e.g., Bernard 
Black, A Proposal for Implementing Retail Competition in the Electricity Industry, 7 ELEC. J. 58, 58 
(calling on regulators to "ignore sunk costs"). Eventually, states developed mechanisms for 
recovery of utilities' stranded costs, often involving fees charged to electric customers. See, e.g., Virginia 
Restructuring Suspended, U.S. ENERGY INFD. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/electricity/ 
policies/restructuring/virginia.html (last visited May 20, 2014) (discussing the imposition of a "wires 
charge" in 1999). 
53. ASPEN INST., supra note 5, at 11-12 ("As Joel Eisen, Professor of Law at University of Richmond 
Law School, explained, there should be some mechanism that provides 'fair compensation for 
the common-carrier function that the distribution utilities provide' that also makes open 
access possible."). 
54. Infra notes 62-66. 
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spin backwards and sell excess power to the grid), laws requmng those 
providing sites for energy facilities to obtain Certificates of Public Conven-
ience and Necessity (CPCNs) from state PUCs, and state and local laws gov-
erning the siting of energy facilities. So for the moment, consider this 
OADT concept for illustrative purposes only. 
B. Is an OADT Necessary? 
The remedy that FERC would seek-the OADT-relies on a tested 
method of providing open access that utilities are already familiar with from 
the OA TT context. Returning to the question with which this Part began, a 
threshold concern is whether an OADT will ever be necessary. One reason it 
is needed stems from the ability of incumbent utilities to oppose change. 
An open network promotes new applications and transformative innovation 
that may unlock latent consumer demand and lead to interactivity on the elec-
tric grid.ss Resisting this open access is a traditional response of incumbents.56 
Here, the incumbents are major investor-owned utilities that can be expected 
to bring powerful opposition to opening the electricity distribution system. It 
is helpful to understand some of the forces animating this opposition. As the 
Edison Electric Institute (EEi, the trade association for major investor-
owned utilities) has discussed in a widely cited report,s7 utilities fear contin-
ued erosion of their market share. Specifically, the EEi report indicates that a 
combination of disruptive technologies and the emergence of networking 
could create a death spiral. As utilities lose customers to other electricity pro-
viders, they would become unprofitable and would have to raise rates on their 
remaining customers. This would drive further declines in market share and 
profits. 
This fear oflosing market share will prompt a backlash against open access. 
Indeed, incumbent utilities already cite the substantial operational, legal, and 
financial barriers to networking as reasons to oppose it. For example, an open 
electric grid in which anyone can put power in or take power out would be 
difficult to keep in balance. Adequate and careful controls would be necessary 
to maintain system reliability and security (including the grid's resistance to 
55. See generally ASPEN INST., supra note 5 (discussing numerous ongoing developments, all of 
which might culminate in the emergence of a smart electricity network). 
56. Sidak & Spulber, supra note 52, at 873 (noting that "[o]pposition to new entry, of course, is a 
predictable response among incumbent firms in any industry"). 
57. KIND, supra note 27, at 19. 
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cyber-attacks58). One context in which utilities are already making these and 
other arguments to resist entities that seek to introduce power onto the elec-
tric grid involves net metering. Net metering is a system under which distrib-
uted generators sell their excess generation back to the grid.59 In net metering 
regimes, renewable energy generation systems owners' electric meters "run 
backwards" to give them credit for any electricity that they put back on the 
electricity grid. Under the typical state net metering law, all electric utilities 
must make net metering available to eligible customers until a statewide cap is 
reached,60 and state PUCs generally have regulations that determine what 
types of systems get net metering credit and how owners are credited on their 
bills by utilities. The typical law permits a wide variety of ownership struc-
tures, including outright ownership and third-party ownership through leases 
and power purchase agreements, permitting business model experimentation.61 
Incumbent utilities have begun to fight net metering.62 In some states, 
they have argued against expansion of programs beyond modest initial sizes, 63 
arguing (among other claims) that net metering unfairly subsidizes renewable 
energy generators at the expense of other ratepayers.64 In other states, utilities 
have successfully spent millions of dollars lobbying state legislatures to im-
pose fees on solar systems to address the perceived cross-subsidization of net 
58. See, e.g., U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILI1Y OFF., CYBERSECURI1Y: CHALLENGES IN SECURING 
THE ELECTRICI1Y GRID 9-10 (2012). 
59. See, e.g., Net Metering, SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. Ass'N, http://www.seia.org/policy/distributed-
solar/net-metering (last visited Feb. 7, 2014). 
60. Policies for Compensating Behind-the-Meter Generation Vary by State, U.S. ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN. (May 9, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=6190. California, 
for example, increased its cap in 2012 to five percent of noncoincident peak load, or approximately 5 .2 
gigawatts. See CAL. Pull. UTILS. COMM'N, DEC. 12-05-036, DECISION REGARDING 
CALCULATION OFTHE NET ENERGY METERING CAP 1 (2012). 
61. See CHELSEA BARNES, AGGREGATE NET METERING: OPPORTUNITIES FOR LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS 7 (2013), available at http://www.icleiusa.org/action-center/aggregate-net-
metering-opportunities-for-local-governments. 
62. Mark Chediak, Christopher Martin & Ken Wells, Utilities Feeling Ror:!ftop Solar Heat Start Fighting 
Back, BLOOMBERG, Dec. 26, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-12-26/utilities-
feeling-rooftop-solar-heat-start-fighting-back.html. 
63. See Devon Swezey, PUCs: On the Front Line ef the Brewing Net Metering Battle, ENERGY 
COLLECTIVE (Aug. 2, 2013), http://theenergycollective.com/devonswezey/256576/pucs-front-
line-brewing-net-metering-battle (noting that as net metering grows, "more and more utilities have 
openly opposed further expansion in the amount they are required to accommodate"). 
64. Jennifer Van Burkleo, U'hen Mom Said Life Isn't Fair,' She Meant Net Metering, POWERGRID 
INT'L (Aug. 1, 2012), available at http://www.elp.com/articles/powergrid_international/print/ 
volume-17 /issue-8/featureslwhen-mom-said-life-isnt-fuir-she-meant-net-metering.html ("By not 
paying their fair share of these charges, net metering customers would make it necessary for their utility 
to raise rates to make up the shortfull, which would shift the burden of these costs onto customers 
without net metering." (quoting Rick Tempchin, executive director of retail energy services at the 
Edison Electric Institute)). 
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metering.65 Nor are utilities' efforts limited to combating net metering. In 
Iowa, an incumbent utility petitioned the state's Utility Board to have a solar 
provider declared a public utility subject to state regulation and in violation of state 
law awarding an exclusive franchise to the utility; the Board agreed but a state dis-
trict court reversed that finding. The Board's appeal to the state's Supreme Court 
is pending.66 
The fights over expanding net metering and the growth of solar systems 
suggests it would be especially important to restrict the utilities' ability to 
hamper open access, because they may prevent networked applications from 
developing. Just as the ability to access library collections in the early 1990s 
hinted at the Internet's transformative potential,67 many applications that 
would use a network are only in the pilot stage. For example, Smart Grid 
demonstration projects ongoing around the world aim to serve as test beds for 
connected technologies.68 Scholars and policymakers are only beginning to 
address privacy69 and data concerns that will affect development of network-
ing applications, including key questions about who owns and controls elec-
tricity usage data, for what purposes this data can be used, and how to 
encourage entrepreneurs to find new and innovative uses for the data.70 
65. A 2013 Arizona law imposes a fixed charge of 70 cents per kilowatt of system capacity 
(about $5/month for a typical system) on solar systems. Diane Cardwell, Compromise in 
Arizona Defers a Solar Power Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2013 (noting that the utilities 
sought a $40-$50 per month charge). Similarly, a 2014 Oklahoma law will impose a 
fixed charge, with the amount yet to be determined. Kiley Kroh, Oklahoma Will Charge 
Customers Who Install Their Own Solar Panels, CLIMATE PROGRESS, Apr. 16, 2014, 
http://thinkprogress.org/ climate/2014/04/16/342 73 92/ oklahoma -fee-solar-wind. See 
generally Gabe Elsner, The Campaign Against Net Metering: ALEC and Utility Interests' Next 
Attack on Clean Energy Swfaces in Arizona, ENERGY & POL 'y INST., Nov. 18, 2013, 
http://www.energyandpolicy.org/the_campaign_against_net_metering_alec_and_utili 
ty _interests_next_attack_on_clean_energy _surfaces_in_arizona (arguing that the efforts 
by utilities and the American Legislative Executive Council are a coordinated campaign to "weaken 
net metering policies"). 
66. SZ Enterprises, LLC v. Iowa Utilities Board, No. 13-0642 (Ia. S.Ct. Jan. 22, 2014); see Grant 
Rodgers, Supreme Court hears Dubuque solar power case, DES MOINES REGISTER, Jan. 22, 
2014 (discussing oral argument in the case). 
67. William Y. Arms, The 1990s: The Formative Years ef Digital Libraries, CORNELL, 
http://www.cs.cornell.edu/wya/papers/LibHiTech-2012.pdf (last visited March 22, 2014). 
68. See, e.g., David Biello, Will You or the Grid Control Your Electric Car?, Ser. AM. (June 18, 2013), 
http:/ /www.scientificamerican.com/ article/ remote-control-of-electric-cars (discussing the Mueller 
neighborhood demonstration project in Austin, Texas, of the Pecan Street Project); ]eju Smart Grid 
Test-Bed, JEJU, http://smartgrid.jeju.go.kr/eng/contents/index.php?mid=0202 (last visited Feb. 21, 
2014) (website of Korean Smart Grid demonstration project involving over 100 companies). 
69. See, e.g., Sonia K. McNeil, Privacy and the Modem Grid,25 HARV.J.L.&TECH.199 (2011); Cheryl 
Dancey Balough, Privacy Implications cf Smart Meters, 86 CHL-KENT L. REV. 161 (2011). 
70. See, e.g., GREEN BU1TON, http://www.greenbuttondata.org/greenabout.htrnl (last visited Jan. 22, 
2014) (claiming that "electricity customers should be able to securely download their own easy-to 
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This leads to two different conclusions about the need for an OADT. 
First, as noted above, we have to establish a network in the absence of con-
sumer demand and rely on the evolving infrastructure to stimulate demand. 
Without openness, however, few developers will push for a network. Fur-
thermore, the utilities are not nimble innovators and are not taking the lead to 
promote networking. In addition, there is no constituency with the means to 
advocate for it against utility resistance, as participants are not focusing on 
creating an open multidirectional network at the distribution level.71 
As we make our way forward, we will make fundamental decisions about 
networking. Many utilities have already demonstrated that they do not see 
the purpose of smart meters (the most visible building block of networking 
infrastructure being deployed today) as empowering networking applications. 
In the near term, they can make decisions that establish fundamental choices 
about consumer preferences and lead to a series of closed proprietary net-
works. For example, the interoperability standards specify that the gateway 
between a consumer and the utility is an "Energy Services Interface" that 
could take a variety of different forms (programmable thermostat, iPad, 
etc.).72 Without intervention to create a right of open access, utilities can 
control this gateway. 
Finally, the regulatory landscape for electric utilities poses a considerable 
barrier to establishing a national network. While electricity moves nationally, 
state PUCs retain substantial regulatory authority over it. FERC regulates 
wholesale electricity transactions and electric transmission in interstate commerce, 
but the states retain authority over such matters as licensing and siting of new 
power plants and transmission lines. This geographic mismatch between 
electricity's flow and its regulation has led numerous scholars to criticize the 
existing regulatory framework, and to suggest innovative federal solutions to 
such matters as transmission siting and standards for the Smart Grid to promote 
network efficiencies.73 Some of these solutions, of course, are only on the 
understand energy usage information from their utility or electricity supplier," and that allowing this 
information to become available could spur entrepreneurs to create "innovative applications that can 
help consumers make the most of their energy usage information"). 
71. See Joel B. Eisen, Residential Renewable Energy: By U'hom?, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 339 
(2011) (discussing distribution-level barriers to more widespread deployment of renewable energy). 
72. CUSTOMER ENERGY SERVICES INTERFACE WHITE PAPER: SMARTGRID INTEROPERABILITY 
PANEL B2G/I2G/H2G DOMAIN ExPERT WORKING GROUPS (Dave Hardin ed., 2011), 
available at htrp://www.gridwiseac.org/ pdfs/forurn_papersll/hardin_paper_gill.pdf (discussing 
the Energy Services Interface concept and its adoption in the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology Framework); see Eisen, supra note 4, 21-24. 
73. See Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Grid Governance: The Role cf a National Network Coordinator, CARDOZO 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2014); Eisen, supra note 4; Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, 
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drawing board, and the presence of fifty state PUCs in the regulatory landscape 
makes the idea of establishing a national smart electricity network a daunting 
proposition. 
For all of these reasons, it is not likely that evolutionary technology-
prompting public policies will eventually accrete to the fundamental equiva-
lent of an open access principle. Thus, there is a need for an OADT, and two 
central questions present themselves. At what point should we establish the 
principle of open access, and what features of technology and legal development 
would indicate that the time has come for open access? 
Ill. MODELS FOR OPEN ACCESS: LESSONS FOR POLICY EVOLUTION 
To address these issues, this Part examines three models drawn from 
different industries that have fundamentally changed in character in the past 
quarter-century, resulting in the formation of new networks (telecommunica-
tions), fundamental alterations to existing ones (wholesale energy markets), 
or fundamental changes to the regulation of interactions in existing networks 
(finance). 
Any direct parallel is difficult, of course, because any examination of an 
industry that transformed is necessarily retrospective after change took place. 
As the smart electricity network evolves, we may not know where we are on 
the policy path toward open access. But while no analogue is directly repre-
sentative of the likely transition, these models offer some potential lessons 
about the timing and other preconditions necessary for revolutionary change. 
The discussion focuses on two parameters: ( 1) timing-what to look for 
in determining whether timing of the transformation is appropriate for open 
access (and what conditions might make open access more desirable to indus-
try actors), and (2) regulatory prerequisites-which are necessary in the near 
term (given that open access is proposed for some future date). Finally, the 
discussion analyzes risks involved in relying on any one particular combina-
tion of timing and regulatory evolution, including federalism concerns. 
A. The Telecommunications Model 
The industry transformation perhaps cited most often as the best model 
for the electric grid's potential to morph into a smart electricity network is the 
Interstate Transmission Challenges for Renewable Energy: A Federalism Mismatch, 65 V AND. L. 
REV. 1801 (2012). 
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modern revolution in telecommunications, specifically in telephone service.74 
The open access provisions of the landmark Telecommunications Act of 
1996 ( 1996 Act)75 ended the monopoly oflocal telephone service and acceler-
ated the transformation to a robust modern communications network. Thus, 
perhaps the most intriguing lesson from the telecommunications model is 
that with the right policy prescription implemented at the right societal mo-
ment, changes in the electricity sector can be just as dramatic and rapid as 
they were in the telephone sector. 
1. Appeal of the Telecommunications Model 
This model is appealing for numerous reasons. First, it involves open 
access to local distribution lines, as the 1996 Act contained specific provisions 
designed to open telephone lines to competition. Second, telecommunica-
tions, like electricity, involves a network industry traditionally regulated as a 
public utility from the early years of the twentieth century.76 Third, telecom-
munications regulatory evolution involved a change to new paradigms of gov-
ernmental involvement, following decades of traditional regulation. Finally, 
the evolution of telephony features the emergence of new actors and new indus-
tries. Its story is one of a displacement of a stodgy, old technology (landlines) 
by an upstart, smaller, more nimble one (wireless) that literally circumvented 
the need for much of the existing infrastructure, resulted in creation of a new 
network, and put economic pressure on existing industry actors.77 
The 1996 Act opened distribution lines, leading to competition in the 
provision of local telephone service and to disruption of an existing industry 
structure dominated by natural monopolies. That open access was to physical 
copper telephone wires, a close analogue to the potential opening of electricity 
distribution wires. Similarly, encouraging competition in the electricity dis-
tribution sector by opening the distribution wires could disrupt natural monopo-
lies. While different types of entities (including municipal utilities and 
74. While the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (1996 Act) made changes in other areas of 
communications law and policy (for example, overhauling the federal rules regarding 
television broadcast ownership), see The Telecommunications Act ef 1996, NTIA.GOV, 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/legacy/otiahomeltop/publicationmedialnewsltr/telcom_act.htrn), this 
Article focuses on the central changes made to telephone law and policy. 
75. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996). 
76. Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulating Telecommunications, 12 YALE]. ON REG. 25, 28 (1995). 
77. See generally GREGORY L. ROSSTON, STAN. INST. FOR ECON. POL 'y RES., THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN TECHNOLOGICAL AND REGULATORY CHANGE IN THE COMMUNICATIONS 
INDUSTRY (2012 ), available at http:! I siepr.stanford.edu/?q=/ system/ files/ shared/ pubs/ papers/pd£' 11-
020.pdf (discussing the evolution of the wireless telephone industry). 
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cooperatives) deliver electricity, the nation's 243 investor-owned utilities continue 
to distribute 75 percent of the nation's electricity.78 Open access to distribu-
tion lines could reduce that share, perhaps dramatically. 
Like the electricity industry, the telecommunications sector is ubiqui-
tous. By one estimate, the 1996 Act was "said to affect as much as one-sixth 
of the American economy."79 Thus, as one scholar noted nearly twenty years 
ago, the "lessons from the telecommunications industry are applicable to other 
network industries such as electric power."80 Moreover, evolution of governmen-
tal involvement in telecommunications did not spell the end of regulation but 
its continuation. Regulation remains in place today in various parts of the tel-
ecommunications sector, albeit in a different form. 81 That transformation is 
significant. For example, Professors Joseph Kearney and Thomas Merrill's 
seminal 1998 article, "The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries 
Law,'' discusses the evolution of regulation from focusing on regulating the 
cost of service to protecting consumers and encouraging entry into the indus-
try, citing both telecommunications and electricity as examples. 
The 1996 Act was a major watershed in telecommunications law and 
policy, 82 and it allocated numerous new regulatory duties to federal, state, and 
local agencies. The focus of telecommunications regulation has shifted in the 
direction that FERC might take with the OADT: promoting market-based 
transactions, with the regulator's role being to ensure the advancement of 
competition.83 Like the shift in telecommunications regulation, the OADT 
would allow regulation to evolve and accompany the rapidity of technological 
change, which has been a hallmark of the telecommunications industry. 84 
Several aspects of the rapid change in telephony technologies are worth 
noting, as they are comparable to the technological evolution some expect in 
78. See Electricity Data, U.S. ENERGY INFD. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data.cfm (last 
visited Feb. 11, 2014). 
79. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation ef Regulated Industries 
Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1326 (1998). 
80. Spulber, supra note 76, at 28. 
81. See Kearney &Merrill, supra note 79, at 1323. 
82. Joseph D. Kearney, From the Fall rf the Bell System to the Telecommunications Act: Regulation rf 
Telecommunications Under Judge Greene, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1395, 1396 ( 1999) (terming the 1996 Act 
"the most important transformative event in telecommunications law since January 1, 1984"). 
83. Kearney &Merrill, supra note 79, at 1361 (noting that in this new paradigm, "the regulator is 
expected to intervene only when there is some reason to conclude that a regime of market-
based transactions will not suffice to advance competition, as where one firm in the industry 
owns a bottleneck facility that has natural monopoly characteristics"). 
84. See Nicholas Economides, The Telecommunications Act rf 1996 and Its Impact, l l ]AP AN & W 0 RLD 
ECON. 455, 456 (1999) (observing that in telecommunications, "[r]apid technological change has 
always been the original cause of regulatory change"). 
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the electric grid. The displacement oflandline telephones by wireless phones 
is a compelling example of a near-comprehensive replacement of "dumb" 
technology by "smart" upgrades, with the "dumb" system still in place but re-
ceding quickly into the dustbin of history in the years after "business leaders 
agreed that mobility was superior to fixed line telephony and that the internet 
beat any other form of transmitting data."85 The new telephone products and 
services have functions and capabilities different from and, in some cases, well 
beyond and more attractive than, those of the existing network (mobile 
phones can do more than landlines). 86 This is also consistent with the litera-
ture about disruptive technologies. New firms, not incumbents, are responsible 
for transformative change. 87 
To many, then, the "dumb" electricity industry resembles the telecom-
munications industry before the 1996 Act, 88 which makes the telecommunications 
model of transformation worthy of further scrutiny. But the 1996 Act's open 
access provisions applied to entrants into the landline local telephone market, 
not wireless telephony. Therefore, one aspect of the "dumb to smart" narra-
tive requires some rethinking. The smart technologies we know today (wireless 
smartphones and applications) were not the subject of the 1996 Act's open 
access provisions. As discussed more fully below, however, a closer parallel to 
the proposed design and features of the OADT would be harder to imagine. 
The 1996 Act's provisions required open access on a nondiscriminatory basis, 
facilitated by interconnection at just and reasonable rates. This makes the 
1996 Act deserving of closer scrutiny as a possible exemplar for transformation of 
the electric grid. 
2. Regulatory Evolution and Effects of the 1996 Act 
The 1996 Act's grand bargain resulted in an open access provision that 
allowed for dramatic change in the telephone network. Understanding this 
provision requires a journey into history and examination of several decades of 
legal twists and turns in the telephone industry. An important part of this 
85. ASPEN INST., supra note 5, at 7. 
86. HENDRICKS &JAMES, supra note 26, at 14 (observing that we have "a telecommunications 
system able to perform its original objectives-providing affordable and universal service-far 
better while branching out to meet new objectives of mobility, interoperability, and data 
integration"). 
87. See e.g., CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR'S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW 
TECHNOLOGIES CAUSE GREAT FIRMS To FAIL 14-19 (1997). 
88. See generally HENDRICKS &JAMES, supra note 26 (observing the many opportunities for the 
electricity industry to transform in ways similar to the telecommunications sector). 
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history is United States v. AT&T, 89 the major antitrust suit brought by the 
federal government in 1974 (after separate litigation dating back to 1949).90 
That lawsuit charged AT&T, which at that time led the Bell System and provid-
ed telephone service to most of the United States, with (among other unlaw-
ful activities) illegally monopolizing the long-distance telephone market.91 
The landmark 1982 Modification of Final Judgment (MFJ) consent decree 
settled this litigation,92 with core provisions that mandated a breakup of the 
Bell System monopoly and imposed prospective restrictions on conduct by 
the newly formed companies.93 AT&T agreed to divest itself of all ownership 
and control of seven regional Bell operating companies (RBOCs),94 each of 
which included local telephone companies that were part of AT&T before 
the breakup.95 RBOCs remained regulated monopolies, each with an exclu-
sive franchise in its region.96 
This remedy reflected the federal government's prevailing contention 
that local telephone service was a natural monopoly, while competition was 
possible in long-distance service. In the early 1980s, AT&T provided nearly 
all of the nation's long-distance telephone service.97 Long-distance service 
became competitive because of the use of microwave towers to provide long-haul 
carriage of telephone calls. Microwave transmission was a major breakthrough 
that created the possibility of competition. But it had no large economies of 
scale and therefore did not threaten to become a natural monopoly itself. In 
the local telephone market, there was no viable competition. Dial-up Internet ac-
cess was just beginning,98 and (as discussed in greater detail below) mobile 
phones were not yet widely available.99 
89. 552 F. Supp.131 (D.D.C.1982). 
90. Id. In his decision, Judge Greene found the proposed consent decree to be in the public interest and 
provided a lengthy description of the history of the AT&T antitrust litigation. Id. 
91. Id. at 139. 
92. Id. at 140-41. 
93. Id. at 141; see also Kearney, supra note 82, at 1410. 
94. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. at 141. 
95. Id. at 141. 
96. Id. at 142. 
97. In the early 1980s, AT&T provided about three-quarters of the nation's local telephone service and 
almost all interstate long-distance service. FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, TRENDS IN TELEPHONE 
SERVICE 1 (2000) [hereinafter FCC], available at http://transition.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Cornrnon_ 
Carrier/Reports/FCC-State_Link/IAD/trendlOO.pdf. 
98. For example, the first Internet Service Provider, The World, did not come into existence until 1989. 
See THE WORLD, http://world.std.com. 
99. See FCC, supra note 97, at 2-3. In December 1984 there were thirty-two cellular telephone systems 
with 91,600 subscribers. Id. 
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The MFJ imposed this so-called line of business restnct10ns on the 
RBOCs.100 It allowed them to market telecommunications services within 
designated local access and transport areas (LAT As), 101 but barred them from 
offering services that crossed LAT A boundaries. Specifically, the RBOCs 
were prohibited, "directly or through any affiliated enterprise, from providing 
long-distance service, manufacturing or providing telecommunications 
equipment or customer premises equipment, or providing so-called information 
services."102 The reason for this was that "each RBOC was a monopolist in its 
own region,'' and the prevailing view was that if RBOCs provided long-
distance service, they could compete unfairly against new entrants in the 
long-distance business.103 
The subsequent period between the breakup of the Bell System in 1984 
after the MFJ and the enactment of the 1996 Act is also important in understand-
ing the 1996 Act's open access provisions.104 In the intervening years, the dis-
tinction between local and long-distance telephone calls had evaporated due 
to dramatic decreases in the cost of transmitting calls over long distance.105 
By 1996, this led to widespread calls to modify or eliminate the MFJ's re-
strictions.106 The 1996 Act's grand bargain between competing long-distance 
and local telephone companies erased the legal boundaries between the local 
telephone and long-distance markets, removing the MFJ line of business 
restrictions that had prevented the RBOCs from offering long-distance tele-
phone service.107 Specifically, the 1996 Act permitted each RBOC to provide 
long-distance services outside of its monopoly service region.108 In return, the 
RBOCs agreed to open their local networks to competitors.109 
Section 251 of the 1996 Act was the central open access provisionY0 It re-
quired incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs)-the RBOCs-to make their 
facilities available to their competitors, known as competing local exchange carriers 
(CLECs).111 Under this section, ILECs were required to offer their competitors 
100. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. at 141, 178. 
101. Id 
102. Kearney, supra note 82, at 1413-14 (quoting Section II(D) of the MFJ). 
103. Economides, supra note 84, at 468. 
104. Kearney, supra note 82, at 1397. 
105. ROSSTON, supra note 77, at 12 n.34. 
106. See Spulber, supra note 76, at 27. 
107. Telecommunications Act of1996 § 101, 47 U.S.C. § 251 (2006). 
108. Id 
109. Id; see also Kearney &Merrill, supra note 79, at 1352 (noting that the 1996 Act "links RBOC 
entry into the long-distance market to the development of competition in their local markets"). 
110. 47U.S.C. § 251. 
111. Id 
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interconnection to their networks "equal in quality to that provided by the local ex-
change carrier to itself or to any subsidiary, affiliate, or any other party to which the 
carrier provides interconnection."112 Furthermore, they were required to offer 
"rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscrirninatory."113 
Section 251 introduced a concept of unbundled access. It required ILECs to offer 
"nondiscriminatory access to network elements on an unbundled basis,'' with access 
taking place "at any technically feasible point on rates, terms, and conditions that 
are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory."114 Section 252(d) empowered state 
public utility commissions to set 'just and reasonable rate[s] for interconnec-
tion."115 Section 25 3 removed barriers to entry to local telephone service, providing 
that "[n]o State or local statute or regulation, or other State or local legal require-
ment, may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to 
provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service."116 
Eventually, observers credited the 1996 Act with promoting the expan-
sive growth of wireless telephone communications entities and technologies. 
As one commentator stated, "In parallel [with changes in long distance], 
wireless telephony grew to great success."117 In 1996, however, the competi-
tive landscape for local telephone service looked far different than it does today. 
America was still a nation of landline phones, and many did not foresee that 
mobile phones would displace landlines so completely. A rapidly growing number 
of Americans had mobile phones, 118 but the ubiquity of wireless was years away. 
At the time, no single best technology existed to replace stationary telephone 
equipment. Indeed, it was not clear which of a number of competing technologies 
would emerge as the primary competitor to landline phones. Two different 
wireless technologies-Personal Communications Service (PCS)119 and the con-
ventional cellular technology now familiar to billions across the globe-were poised 
for growth. There was no such thing as a national cellular network. Years before, 
the FCC had allocated two licenses in each metropolitan area to would-be wireless 
112. Id; see also Economides, supra note 84, at 11. 
113. 47 U.S.C. § 251; see also Hannibal Travis, Wi-Fi Everywhere: Universal Broadband Access as 
Antitrust and Telecommunications Policy, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1697, 1726 (2006) (discussing this 
provision). 
114. 47U.S.C. § 25l(c)(3) (2006). 
115. 47U.S.C. § 252(d)(l). 
116. 47U.S.C. § 253(a). 
117. Economides, supra note 84, at 1. 
118. See FCC, supra note 97, at 2-3 (showing that there were 44,042,992 cellular telephone subscribers in 
December 1996 in contrast to 681,825 subscribers a decade earlier). 
119. Spulber, supra note 76, at 44 ("Personal Communications Service (PCS) is the next major 
advance in cellular telephone service. It is similar to conventional cellular service, except it is 
higher frequency, all digital."). 
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companies. One license went to an existing wireline company, and one went to a 
wireless entrant.120 But the infrastructure for seamless regional calls did not exist 
yet, and the familiar cell towers were not in place in most of the nation. Using fiber 
optic cable for phone calls (what we now know as voice over IP or VoIP) was in its 
infancy and did not merit any mention in the 1996 Act.121 
One interesting technology emerging at the time deserves mention because 
it has a parallel in today's electric grid. So-called competitive access providers 
(CAPs) allowed business and commercial entities to lay their own telephone 
wires and make calls at their own premises.122 If this sounds familiar, one 
should note the same idea is sprouting up in today's microgrids123 that self-
generate electricity in islands without connections to the electric grid. Some 
CAPs began to offer local telephone calling services to a broader range of cus-
tomers, 124 and by virtue of this expansion became CLE Cs that took advantage of 
the 1996 Act's open access provisions.125 
These technologies seemed promising at the time. The combination of 
potential and uncertainty make law review articles from the mid-1990s seem 
alternately prescient in their predictions of a wireless future and quaint in 
their hedging ofbets on which technology would survive. For example, consider 
this understatement from 1996: "[C]onsumers will still be wary of replacing 
the wired telephone and the local access provider that has served them for 
over a decade."126 
Separate incentives for wireless promoted its development. The 1996 
Act encouraged wireless telephony through a number of provisions. The 
FCC did not acquire the power to preempt state and local laws about siting, 
but the 1996 Act limited state regulation. For example, state and local gov-
ernments were limited in their ability to delay applications for cell tower siting. 127 
120. ROSSTON, supra note 77, at 5. 
121. See Economides, supra note 84, at 41 ("The Telecommunications Act of 1996 did not legislate 
any framework for the most revolutionary of all current innovations in telecommunications, 
Internet telephony, or more precisely Internet Protocol ("IP") telephony."). 
122. "In the 1980s, competitive access providers (CAPs) began to market to business customers 
access services provided over CAPs wired networks." FCC, supra note 97, at 9-1; see also 
Spulber, supra note 76, at 40, 44. 
123. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text. 
124. See FCC, supra note 97, at 9-1. 
125. Id 
126. Lisa M. Warner, Wireless Technologies Creating Competition in the Local Exchange Market: How 
Will Local Exchange Carriers Compete?, 4 COMMLAWCONSPECTUS 51, 52 (1996). 
127. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 704, 110 Stat. 56, 151 (codified at 
47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)). This hybrid was the first federal statutory provision that "empowers 
local governments to make primary siting decisions, subject to federal constraints on the 
decisionmaking process." Ashira P. Ostrow, Process Preemption in Federal Siting Regimes, 48 
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This provision promoted dramatic growth m cell towers but has sparked 
much controversy since 1996.128 
3. Lessons for a Smart Electricity Network 
The lengthy history of evolution in telephone regulation, stretching back 
for decades, has much to offer as a potential model for the transition to a 
smart electricity network. 
a. Signifiers That a Transition to Open Access Is Possible 
With respect to the first parameter-signifiers that a transition to open 
access is possible (and will therefore garner support)-the first lesson comes 
from the MFJ and its litigation backdrop. Without an existing, pervasive le-
gal culture promoting deregulation (exemplified by the Bell System breakup 
despite the regulations that remained in place thereafter for over a decade), 
the open access provisions of the 1996 Act would not have been possible. 
This has enormous implications for using the telephone industry as a model 
for transitioning to the smart electricity network. Simply put, the telephone 
industry had begun ending the domination of vertically integrated monopo-
lists. The monopoly over the market for comprehensive telephone service 
had ended, and then, a decade later, the distribution market (local telephone 
service) opened. 
Another signifier stems from the central feature of the 1996 Act's grand 
bargain. Bargainers on all sides believed there were lucrative business oppor-
tunities to be gained from open access. Political consensus was possible because 
numerous constituencies thought it was in their best interest to support reform of 
the telecommunications industry.129 This allowed a political compromise. 
Congress could appear balanced130 in extending a market opportunity to the 
HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 289, 289 (2011). Professor Ostrow terms this use of a federal statute to 
compel a local authority to site nationally important infrastructure "process preemption." Id. 
128. A substantial body of law exists that interprets this provision, and describing it in detail is 
beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC., 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013) 
(extending Chevron deference to a FCC declaratory ruling on the provision). 
129. See HENDRICKS &JAMES, supra note 26, at 14 ("All parties-long distance carriers, local 
phone companies, wireless and data providers, cable companies, and emerging Internet 
technologies-needed clearer market rules in the form of federal policy. The emergence of a coherent 
industry voice in favor of policies to structure improved market rules set the stage for 
compromise and bipartisan action.") 
130. Economides, supra note 84, at 9 ("The great success of competition in long distance allowed 
US Congress to appear 'balanced' in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 by establishing 
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RBOCs while still requiring them to offer open access to their distribution 
lines. Action to provide open access was easier because Congress was not re-
quired to act against the interest of an industry sector that wielded considera-
ble political clout. Notably, the 1996 Act's grand bargain did not affect the 
RBOCs' ability to enter the wireless market. The RBOCs believed (wrongly, 
as it turned out131) the long-distance market was the plum.132 
This required the erosion of natural monopoly as a precondition. As ob-
servers of the 1996 Act have noted, legal change is appropriate when the 
regulated industry no longer retains the character of a natural monopoly and 
barriers to entry are lower.133 This is particularly true in a network industry 
when entrants do not need to develop new network infrastructure, 134 and the 
1996 Act provides an excellent example of how this occurs. The grand bargain 
was possible because of the introduction of competition in long-distance service. 
In 1984, AT&T's share of the nation's long-distance telephone traffic was 
90.1 percent. In 1996, its share was 47.9 percent, and it continued to drop in 
the years after that. 135 Also, the new technology (microwave transmission) 
that enabled AT&T's competitors to enter the long-distance market had not, 
by itself, led to natural monopoly.136 
In the electric grid, it may take years for a comparable market opportuni-
ty to more fully erode local distribution utilities' natural monopoly. Like mi-
crowave transmission of long-distance telephone service, one or more of the 
technologies that utilities fear will disrupt their business model (rooftop solar, 
distributed generation, microgrids, and demand response) 137 may create sub-
stantial supply and satisfy demand without depending on existing distribution 
lines.138 In turn, these technologies would enable firms to transform into via -
competition in local telephony, while allowing RBOCs into long distance after they meet 
certain conditions."). 
131. See FCC, supra note 97, at 14-8 tbl.14.6 (showing year-over-year decreases in long distance 
rates and revenue). 
132. See Economides, supra note 84, at 4 ("[T]he Act definitely overestimated the importance of 
ILE Cs' long distance entry as an incentive for ILE Cs to open their local markets to competition."). 
133. See Spulber, supra note 76, at 47. 
134. See id. 
135. FCC, supra note 97, at 11-6 tbl.11.3. 
136. See id. at 11-7 tbl.11.4 (setting forth market shares of the competitors to AT&T, including 
MCI and Sprint). 
137. See generally KIND, supra note 27 (discussing disruptive challenges to the utility industry). 
138. There is a critical distinction between telephony and electricity in the location of the market 
opportunity. In telephony, competition arose in the use of interlocal access and transport area 
(LATA) long distance, not the local lines subject to the open access provisions. In electricity, 
distributed energy resources would potentially bypass the very lines being opened. This 
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ble competitors to distribution utilities. Today, however, it is hard to foresee 
which firms will succeed at doing that. 
At some point in time it may appear that the natural monopoly is erod-
ing. Following the logic of this model, it would be timely to open electricity 
distribution lines to promote the interests of new entrants if utilities would 
receive some tangible benefit.139 Economic or other incentives to electric dis-
tribution utilities to enter into specific markets might serve as a carrot to the 
stick of requiring them to open their local wires to competitors. The chal-
lenge is that, even with the recent dramatic progress, deployment of new 
technologies has proven elusive for the last several decades. If these technolo-
gies gain increased market share over the coming years or decades, that may 
prompt utilities to be more accepting of government-mandated open access. 
In the future, one possible indication that this transformation has taken 
place (beyond advanced deployment of cutting-edge technologies) is suggest-
ed by the morphing in telephony of CAPs into CLE Cs before the enactment 
of the 1996 Act. These companies originally provided service to limited areas, 
without interconnection to the wider marketplace. Then, they began to offer 
service beyond their original limits, evolving their business model to expand 
their portfolio of products and services and becoming companies that intended to 
benefit from open access to local telephone lines. It is perhaps foreseeable in 
the electric grid that a similar growth and transformation of companies that 
appear narrowly focused may take place. For example, a demand response 
firm may learn enough about its customers that it undertakes to supply them 
with electricity.140 At that time, open access would appear to be more appropriate. 
b. Necessary Regulatory Prerequisites 
With respect to the second parameter-necessary regulatory prerequi-
sites-it is worth noting that the opening of local telephone lines required 
numerous critical legal developments over the decades before the 1996 Act, 
all of which led to that statute. In addition to the litigation resulting in the 
breakup of the Bell System, federal agency and judicial support was instru-
mental in encouraging the new technologies that changed the telephone industry. 
Article contends, however, that the important factor is the quid pro quo of comparability, not 
the precise location of the market opportunity. 
139. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing the potential for compensating utilities 
for stranded costs in the OADT). 
140. For a discussion of demand response and its role in electricity markets, see Joel B. Eisen, Who 
Regulates the Smart Grid?: FERC'sAuthority Over Demand Response Compensation in Wholesale 
Electricity Markets, 4 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE &ENERGY L. 69 (2012-2013). 
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Specific types of support included regulatory authorization of new technolo-
gies, and judicial intervention to supervene barriers faced by new entrants, 
particularly in several different instances when those entrants needed access to 
existing networks. 
A central example involved microwave transmission, the technology that 
disrupted long-distance telephone service. Without encouragement of this 
technology, the erosion of the natural monopoly in long-distance telephone 
service may never have occurred. The development of competition by com-
panies using microwave technology with AT&T's long-distance telephone 
service took numerous years and many legal developments, including deci-
sions of the FCC and decisions by federal appeals courts. A brief summary of 
this history will necessarily omit many details but suffices to illustrate basic 
principles. 
The first development promoting microwave systems was the FCC's 
1959 Above 890141 decision, in which the Commission authorized companies 
to build their own private line microwave communications systems, using a 
dedicated portion of the radio spectrum above 890 MHz.142 This did not au-
thorize companies to become common carriers over microwave systems. In 
1964, however, Microwave Communications, Inc. (later MCI) filed an appli-
cation with the FCC to construct a microwave transmission network to provide 
service between St. Louis and Chicago.143 MCI proposed to handle the transmis-
sions between microwave transmitters, leaving its customers to arrange for in-
terconnection between MCI's equipment and the customers' own 
equipment.144 While MCI was making its application, the President's Task 
Force on Communication Policy issued a report, which contained a recom-
mendation to allow so-called specialized common carriers (like MCI, although 
the report did not name it) free access into the private line business.145 
The MCI application posed a competitive threat to AT&T in long-distance 
telephone transmission. As one book about telecommunications policy at the 
time puts it, "FCC officials were reluctant to grant this authorization because 
141. 27 F.C.C. 359 (1959), recon. denied, 29 F.C.C. 825 (1960). 
142. Id at 362-63. 
143. See Applications of Microwave Commc'ns, Inc., 18 F.C.C.2d 953 (1969), recon. denied, 21 
F. C. C.2d 190 ( 1970) (detailing MCI's application and approving it). 
144. This aspect of the application is discussed in Bell Tel. Co. of Pa. v. FCC, 503 F.2d 1250, 1254 
(3d Cir. 1974); see also PETER TEMIN WITH LOUIS GALAMBOS, THE FALL OF THE BELL 
SYSTEM: A STUDY IN PRICES AND POLITICS 50 (1987) (discussing this impact of this aspect 
of the application). 
145. See EUGENE V. ROSTOW, PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON COMMUNICATIONS POLICY: 
FINAL REPORT ch. 6, 22-23 (1968). 
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it would put MCI in direct competition with AT&T."146 After some delay, 
the FCC "[r]ecogniz[ed] the need to foster the commercial development of new 
technologies"147 and approved MCI's proposed service in 1969 by a 4-3 vote.148 
Following MCI's approval from the FCC, it and numerous other com-
panies applied to the Commission for approval of private line services. This 
prompted the major decision in Specialized Common Carrier Services, 149 in 
which the FCC set forth principles to govern applications of these new 
firms. 150 This decision served as the basis for the Commission's later grants of 
facilities authorizations to carriers, including MCI, to provide microwave 
communications services.151 In its rulemaking proposal and subsequent deci-
sion, the FCC stated that it was concerned with five basic issues, including 
"[w]hether as a general policy the public interest would be served by permit-
ting the entry of new carriers in the specialized communications field; and if 
so, ... [ w ]hat is the appropriate means for local distribution of the proposed 
services?"152 The FCC concluded: 
[T]here is a public need and demand for the proposed facilities and 
services and for new and diverse sources of supply, competition in 
the specialized communications field is reasonably feasible, there 
are grounds for a reasonable expectation that new entry will have 
some beneficial effects, and there is no reason to anticipate that 
new entry would have any adverse impact on service to the public 
by existing carriers such as to outweigh the considerations support-
ing new entry. We further find and conclude that a general policy 
in favor of the entry of new carriers in the specialized communica-
tions field would serve the public interest, convenience, and necessi ty. 153 
146. KIMBERLY A. ZARKIN & MICHAEL J. ZARKIN, THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS 
COMMISSION: FRONT LINE INTHE CULTURE AND REGULATION WARS 63 (2006). 
147. Id at64. 
148. Microwave Commc'ns, Inc., 18 F.C.C.2d at 967. 
149. Specialized Common Carrier Servs. in the Domestic Pub. Point-to-Point Microwave Radio 
Serv., 29 F.C.C.2d 870 (1971), affd sub nom. Wash. Utils. & Transp. Comm'n v. FCC, 513 
F.2d 1142 (9th Cir.1975). 
150. Id 
151. See 47 U.S.C. § 214 (2006). 
152. Specialized Common Carrier Servs., 29 F.C.C.2d at 878 (quoting Specialized Common Carrier 
Servs. in the Domestic Pub. Point-to-Point Microwave Radio Serv., 24 F.C.C.2d 318, 327 
(1970)); see also Bell Tel. Co. of Pa. v. FCC, 503 F.2d 1250, 1255 (3d Cir. 1974) (discussing 
the proposal and decision). 
153. Specialized Common Carrier Servs., 29 F.C.C.2d at 920. 
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Later, in its landmark series of three Execunet decisions, 154 the D.C. Cir-
cuit returned to AT&T's ongoing refusal to provide interconnections for the 
specialized carriers. As part of its earlier decision approving MCI's applica-
tion, the FCC recognized that connecting to AT&T's network might pose 
problems for MCI's customers.155 That had proven prescient. As Judge]. 
Skelly Wright wrote forthe D.C. Circuit, "MCI has met with almost continuous 
resistance from AT&T in its efforts to provide communications services."156 
MCI sought a cease and desist order against AT&T and an affirmative order 
that AT&T was required to provide any physical connections "essential" to 
the rendition of"all" the services which any of the specialized common carri-
ers "presently or hereafter" are authorized to offer.157 The FCC rejected this 
request for MCI's Execunet service, 158 but the D.C. Circuit reversed the 
Commission.159 As one observer notes, by requiring AT&T to interconnect 
with MCI's service, the Execunet II decision "was historic in that it had the effect 
of casting aside the decades-old AT&T monopoly in long distance telephone 
service and forcing the FCC to open the door to competition."160 
Without another landmark FCC decision, the principle of interconnec-
tion would not have been possible. In the 1956 Hush-A-Phone case, 161 involving a 
plastic device designed to attach to the phone to reduce the risk of overhearing a 
phone call, the D.C. Circuit held that prohibition of a "foreign attachment" 
supplied by the telephone customer was "in unwarranted interference with 
154. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977) [hereinafter Execunet I]; MCI 
Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 580 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1978) [hereinafter Execunet ll]; Lincoln Tel. & 
Tel. Co. v. FCC, 659F.2d1092 (D.C. Cir. 1981) [hereinafter Execunet III]. 
155. The FCC stated: 
Since [the existing carriers J have indicated that they will not voluntarily provide 
loop service we shall retain jurisdiction of this proceeding in order to enable 
MCI to obtain from the Commission a prompt determination on the matter of 
interconnection. Thus, at such time as MCI has customers and the facts and 
details of the customers' requirements are known, MCI may come directly to 
the Commission with a request for an order of interconnection. 
Applications ofMicrowave Commc'ns, Inc., 18 F.C.C.2d 953, 965 (1969). 
156. Execunet II, 580 F.2d at 591. 
157. Bell Sys. Tariff Offerings, 46 F.C.C.2d 413, 438 (1974), affd sub nom. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa. v. 
FCC, 503 F.2d 1250. 
158. See AT&T Co., 67F.C.C.2d1455 (1978) 
159. Execunet II, 580 F.2d at 592. 
160. ZARKIN &ZARKIN, supra note 146, at 64. 
161. Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956); see also Kearney & 
Merrill, supra note 79, at 1341 (noting that with respect to equipment provided by customers, 
"although the lawfulness of this restriction was called into question as early as 1956 in the 
Hush-a-Phone case, the FCC did not begin requiring carriers to unbundle customer premises 
equipment from local phone service until the late 1960s" (footnote omitted)). 
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the telephone subscriber's right reasonably to use his telephone in ways which 
are privately beneficial without being publicly detrimental."162 
Then, in 1968, the FCC ruled in the Carteifone case163 that AT&T's 
prohibition of the Carterfone device that manually connected private two-
way radio systems to the telephone network was unlawful and that privately 
manufactured devices could connect to the telephone network as long as their 
manufacturers met interface standards.164 The FCC's ruling in Carteifone had 
the far-reaching impact of allowing the FCC to deregulate customer premises 
equipment.165 This cleared the way not only for MCI's system to connect to 
the telephone network but also for devices such as answering machines, fax 
machines, and modems to connect without network alterations by the tele-
phone company.166 As a recent commentary puts it, "[t]he Carterfone deci-
sion enabled consumers to purchase modems from countless sources .... Without 
easy and inexpensive consumer access to modems, the Internet would not 
have become the global medium that it is today."167 
Perhaps even more important in establishing open access principles was 
the FCC's Computer Inquiries series of three landmark decisions occurring in 
1966, 197 6, and 1986.168 These decisions, while completely different from 
one another in context and results, addressed two different themes centering 
on the rapid advancement of computer technologies and their interaction 
with the telephone network The new technology (which Computer I called "data 
processing") was "highly competitive and innovative and demonstrate[d] no 
need for regulation."169 Yet the ability of new service providers to compete 
with the established telephone companies depended on them to make the 
162. Hush-A-Phone Corp., 238 F.2d at 267, 269. 
163. In re Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tel. Serv., 13 F.C.C.2d 420 (1968). 
164. Id at 423-24. 
165. The FCC's customer premises equipment rules are found today at 47 C.F.R. pt. 68 (2013). 
166. See David Brodwin, Carterfone Case Showed How Regulations Promote Competition, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REP. (June 28, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/economic-
intelligence/2012/06/28/carterfone-case-showed-how-regulations-promote-competition. 
167. Jason Oxman, The FCC and the Unregulation efthe Internet 15 (Fed. Commc'ns Comrn'n Office of 
Plans &Policy, Working Paper No. 31,1999), available at http://www.fcc.gov/working-papers/fcc-
and-unregulation-internet. 
168. Regulatory & Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer & Commc'n 
Servs. & Facilities, 28 F.C.C.2d 291 (1970) [hereinafter Computer I] (tentative decision); 
Amendment of Sec. 64.702 of the Comm'n's Rules & Regulations (Second Computer 
Inquiry), 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980) [hereinafter Computer II] (final decision); Amendment of 
Secs. 64.702 of the Comm' n's Rules and Regulations. (1bird Computer Inquiry), 104 F.C.C.2d 
958 (1986) [hereinafter Computer III] (report and order). 
169. Robert Cannon, The Legacy cf the Federal Communications Commission's Computer Inquiries, 55 
FED. COMM. L.J. 167, 180 (2003). 
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communications network available. As a former Senior Counsel of the FCC 
has noted: 
Computer services were a disruptive technology. They were sub-
stitute services for traditional incumbent communication services. 
They were highly competitive, highly innovative, and had low barriers 
to entry. . . . In addition, these computer network services were 
dependent upon the underlying communications network. Thus, 
the unregulated computer services were simultaneously substitute 
services for the traditional regulated communications networks and 
also dependent upon them.170 
The FCC had to determine whether it had regulatory jurisdiction to ad-
dress this problem and, if it did, whether to establish safeguards that would 
allow the new market for data processing services to grow while simultane-
ously ensuring that regulated telephone companies would not dominate it. 171 
At first, these safeguards were structural. Under Computer ls Maximum 
Safeguards policy, telephone companies could enter the computer services 
market but had to establish separate subsidiaries to do so.172 Over the course 
of its next two decisions, the FCC adjusted its remedies. The Comparably 
Efficient Interconnection provision of Computer III, for example, required the 
newly formed RBOCs to open their networks to providers of computer services.173 
Throughout the Computer Inquiries decisions, the FCC went well beyond 
requiring interconnection of physical equipment to the phone network. It 
embarked on far-reaching experiments to open the communications network 
to providers of enhanced services. The importance of this series of decisions 
cannot be overstated. One scholar terms the Computer Inquiries decisions "a 
necessary precondition for the success of the Internet."174 
This lengthy story of encouragement of competition to the established 
telephone network has many potential lessons for the transformation of the 
electric grid. First and foremost, it demonstrates that persistence of governmental 
support and encouragement over a period of decades may be required to overcome 
the monopoly position of entrenched incumbents. Governmental policy en-
couraging new technologies came at the highest level, in the form of a Presidential 
Task F orce.175 Later, as the history of microwave transmission demonstrates, three 
170. Id. at 168. 
171. See id. at 169. 
172. Computer I, supra note 168, at 302--04. 
173. Computer III, supra note 168, at 962-64. 
174. Cannon, supra note 169, at 169. 
175. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
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distinct types of support were necessary: (1) support for the technology itself (the 
Above 890 decision, for example),176 (2) support for specific individual companies 
(the decision on MCI's application, for example), 177 and (3) support for entire 
disruptive industries and service providers (in Specialized Common Carriers 
and Computer Inquiries, for example).178 
As was the case with MCI in telephone service, licensing of specific en-
trants into competition with utilities might be necessary to transform the 
electric grid.179 Depending on which market competitors would enter, licens-
ing might take action by state PUCs, not FERC. If the competitors were 
selling electricity to retail customers, they would be subject to state regulation 
of their entry into the business. This might also require the new entrants to 
face the same quantum of regulation as incumbent utilities. Proceedings akin 
to Specialized Common Carriers might be necessary at the state level to determine 
whether different treatment of new entrants is warranted. 
Another prerequisite would be widespread implementation of policies 
requiring direct interconnection with the electric grid for specific providers of 
products and services to end use consumers, and years to enable these provid-
ers to grow and compete with established utilities (as MCI and its competi-
tors had before open access was established). As an example of this, the 
battles over expanded net metering may turn out to be the electric grid's 
Carteifone. 180 They may someday be remembered not as much for the specific 
technology connected to the grid (no one in 2014 uses a Carterfone) or the 
means of connection, but for introducing the principle of universal direct 
connection to the grid and, therefore, making more comprehensive business 
models possible. 
c. Risks in Relying on the Model 
The risks involved in relying on any one particular combination of tim-
ing and regulatory transformation include financial risks (upstart firms' in-
vestment is unstable, transaction costs may mount, and competitors may be at 
a disadvantage against incumbents) and federalism concerns. One central fi-
nancial risk in the telecommunications model is apparent from the sheer 
176. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
177. See supra notes 119-20, 123-24 and accompanying text. 
178. See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text. 
179. See, e.g., Joel B. Eisen, Can Urban Solar Become a 'Disruptive" Technology?: The Case far Solar 
Utilities, 24 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PuB. POL'Y 53 (2010) (calling for chartering of 
solar utilities as competitors to utilities). 
180. Supra notes 62-66. 
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length of time that elapsed between the Carteifone case and the 1996 Act: It 
might take decades to establish the principle of full open access in the elec-
tricity distribution network. Consequently, the benefits from encouraging 
competition might be lost or diminished in the near term. If no robust ex-
pansion of consumer demand and services follows the near-term regulatory 
encouragement, the financial advantages to be gained from open access may 
never materialize. 
Another risk is that prospective entrants into competition with utilities 
may incur the substantial transaction costs of a lengthy confrontation. The 
personal persistence and tenacity ofWilliam McGowan, MCI's founder, was 
pivotal in leading to open access in long-distance telephone service.181 It 
might take a similar individual or group to do the same in the electric grid. 
And MCI pursued its cause in multiple fora: before the FCC, in the federal 
courts, and elsewhere.182 This was an expensive proposition. A recurring joke 
at the time was that MCI was a "law firm with an antenna on the roof'183 because 
it spent large sums on litigation fighting AT&T. Many utilities are Fortune 
500 companies with deep pockets.184 Their competitors, like MCI, should 
similarly be prepared to expend substantial resources. 
If the history of telephone regulation is an indication, potential entrants 
must also be prepared to deal with delays that can stretch into years. As noted 
above, the FCC took several years to approve MCI's original application before 
the FCC.185 Even after the Carteifone decision, it took several years for the 
FCC to issue rules on connection of customer provided equipment.186 The 
electric grid is no stranger to delay (consider the length of time it has taken 
some states to put in place and expand their net metering programs187), so a 
long-term commitment to disrupting the electric distribution network will be 
181. See, e.g., Carla Lazzareschi, MCI Founder McGowan Is Dead at 64, LA. TIMES, June 9, 1992, 
http://articles.latimes.com/1992-06-09/business/fi-282_1_bill-mcgowan ("McGowan almost 
single-handedly popped the telephone monopoly .... He got past the regulators, the industry, the 
lobbyists and the courts." (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
182. Id 
183. Id 
184. Twenty-two gas and electric utilities, including such heavyweights as Exelon (#145), Southern (#152), 
Duke Energy (#186), and Dominion Resources (#187) are members of the Fortune 500. See Fortune 
500, CNN MONEY (May 21, 2012), http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortunelfortune500/2012/ 
industries/143. 
185. See supra notes 119, 123-24 and accompanying text 
186. The FCC first issued rules on CPE in 1980, over a decade after Carteifone. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 
Connection of Telephone Equipment, Systems and Protective Apparatus to Certain Private 
Line Services, and Related Changes; Signal Power Limitations; Accommodation of 4-Wire 
Telephone Network Connections and Interfaces, 45 Fed. Reg. 20,830 (Mar. 31, 1980). 
187. Net Metering, supra note 59. 
1748 61 UCLA L. REV.1712 (2014) 
required of any would-be competitors. Reversals of hard-won victories (such 
as the FCC's original decision not to require interconnection of MCI's 
Execunet service188 that prompted the series oflawsuits described above) will 
take place, and will require still more in the way of commitment. 
The power dynamics of the 1996 Act's grand bargain suggest yet another 
risk. Competitors may have to accrue political power so legislators and regulators 
view them as viable alternatives to incumbent utilities and as equally deserv-
ing participants in their own right in agency and legislative deliberations. 
The grand bargain took place between two sets of entities (AT&T and the 
RBOCs) that were major companies, not start-ups. By contrast, competitors 
in the electric grid today do not have the same ability to wield political clout as 
utilities that have lengthy records ofinteraction with FERC and state PU Cs. 
Finally, there are numerous federalism risks. An important one is that as 
new entrants find their way into competition, there may be debates about 
which level of government has jurisdiction to handle disagreements. As an 
example in telephone regulation, in 1973, AT&T resisted the FCC's request 
that it offer interconnection to MCI's facilities and stated that it would take 
this issue up with the state PUCs that regulated it. 189 The FCC responded 
that it, not state commissions, had jurisdiction, and the matter was ultimately 
settled by the Third Circuit.190 With the smart electricity network, this risk is 
greater because the line in electricity regulation between federal and state 
government jurisdiction is not precise.191 Already, there are high-profile battles 
over the limits of state and federal authority to reshape the electric grid, and, 
as the telephone model suggests, they are almost certain to continue. This 
does not mean that open access is impossible to achieve, but it does suggest that 
more uncertainty and delay are possible. 
d. Final Thoughts About the Telephone Model 
The timing of policy evolution one would expect in a smart electricity 
network following the telephone regulation model might be best described as 
early-stage encouragement of disruptive technologies, followed by intervention to 
define network access and rules at a tipping point. It would require near-term 
188. See AT&T Co., 67F.C.C.2d 1455 (1978). 
189. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa. v. FCC, 503 F.2d 1250, 1256 (3d Cir. 1974) ("AT&T informed the 
Commission that it would provide local loop service to MCI, but that it could do so only after 
first receiving clearance from the appropriate state regulatory commissions."). 
190. Id at 1257, 1282. 
191. See infra notes 208-216 and accompanying text. 
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regulatory decisions and would culminate in congressional intervention 
through amendments to the Federal Power Act (FP A), not a regulatory OADT. 
That distinction hardly means the telecommunications model is inapt. 
Despite the occasional dissimilarities, many of its parallels resonate deeply in 
the challenges inherent in building out a national network. The model de-
pends on a consensus that new business opportunities depend on open access, 
which can develop at any time as the preferences of participants in the process 
shift. This suggests that there is a long course ahead for open access to the 
electric grid, with many intermediate steps necessary before full open access is 
in place. If indicators of a market share shift are significant enough to warrant 
intervention-for example, the fear on the part of utilities that they will lose 
market share materializes more concretely into actual market losses-then it 
may be time to move forward and propose a principle of open access. Conversely, 
if we have gone too long without significant take-up of new technologies, we 
may need to do more lest the market share shift never occur. 
B. The Electricity Model 
Another possible model for the transformation to a smart electricity 
network is the earlier overhaul of the electricity industry itsel£ During the restruc-
turing that began in the 1990s, 192 FERC issued a series oflandmark rules designed 
to create wholesale markets for electricity and open the nation's transmission lines. 
1. Regulatory Evolution and Appeal of the Electricity Model 
The restructuring of the electric grid was prompted in part by two major 
FERC rules. FERC Order 888, discussed in more detail above, promoted 
wholesale competition through open access to transmission services by public 
utilities.193 FERC Order 2000 encouraged the formation of "Regional 
Transmission Organizations" (RTOs) to supervise regional grids and promote 
the development of new transmission capacity.194 
One appealing aspect of this parallel is that it took place in the electric 
grid. Restructuring was at least partially successful in reforming and providing 
open access to the electric grid and opening the nation to electricity competition.195 
192. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Completing the Process ef Restructuring the Electricity Market, 40 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 451 (2005). 
193. FERC Order 888, supra note 3. 
194. Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 810 Oan. 6, 2000) [hereinafter FERC 
Order 2000] (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). 
195. See, e.g., id. 
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In restructuring, monopolies in interstate transmission of electricity ended, and 
much of the nation saw competition at the retail level with consumers able to 
choose their electricity generators.196 In sixteen states, customers can choose 
the entity that generates their electricity, although in all but Texas, the cus-
tomer still receives electricity from the incumbent distribution utility.197 In the end, 
traditional vertically integrated utilities still serve millions of consumers.198 Even 
so, the opening of transmission lines and promoting wholesale competition-
and the resulting partial deregulation of the industry at the retail level-make the 
electricity model useful to consider. 
2. Lessons for a Smart Electricity Network 
a. Signifiers That a Transition to Open Access Is Possible 
In Order 888, FERC set forth a different and expanded interpretation of 
its statutory mandate, responding to the shifting conditions in the industry. 
Order 888 begins with a lengthy discussion of changing conditions in the 
electricity industry and follows with a conclusion that transmission owners 
were hindering a more dramatic transformation of the industry: 
However, it became increasingly clear that the potential consumer 
benefits that could be derived from these technological advances 
could be realized only if more efficient generating plants could ob-
tain access to the regional transmission grids. Because many tradi-
tional vertically integrated utilities still did not provide open access 
to third parties and still favored their own generation if and when 
they provided transmission access to third parties, barriers contin-
ued to exist to cheaper, more efficient generation sources.199 
In issuing Order 888, FERC broadened its traditional interpretation of 
its undue discrimination authority under the FPA.200 Traditionally, an undue 
discrimination inquiry focused on similarly situated third-party customers; if 
196. Status ef Electricity Restructuring By State, U.S. ENERGY INFD. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/elec 
tricity/policies/restructuring/restructure_elect.htrnl (last visited July 5, 2014) (mapping states in 
which retail competition is active as of2010). 
197. MASS. INST. OF TECH, supra note 15. 
198. 2012 Utility Bundled Retail Sales-Residential, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/ 
electricity/sales_revenue_price/pdf/table6.pdf (last visited July 5, 2014). 
199. FERC Order 888, supra note 3, at 21,546. 
200. Section 205 of the Federal Power Act prohibits unreasonable rates and undue discrimination 
"with respect to any transmission or sale subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission," 16 
U.S.C. § 824d(b) (2012), and Section 206 gives FERC the power to correct such unlawful 
practices, 16 U.S.C. § 824(e) (2012). 
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they faced different rates, terms, or conditions, the inquiry became whether 
factual differences among these customers justified disparate treatment.201 In 
Order 888, FERC extended this inquiry to consider the rates, terms, and 
conditions of customers using transmission lines as compared to a utility's use 
of its own transmission system.202 
FERC based its Order on judicial comparability decisions finding that 
conditions had changed in the electric utility industry.203 In Order 888, 
FERC decided that an OA TT was necessary to address undue discrimination 
precisely because it would require a transmission provider to offer all those 
seeking transmission service the same terms and conditions as the transmis-
sion owner's own use.204 While this was an extension of its prior exercises of 
power, it justified its position given the changing industry landscape, includ-
ing the greater availability of generators that wished to use the transmission 
lines but had found it difficult to secure access, as noted above.205 
Similarly, a finding that the current grid structure hampers the desired 
open access would support FERC action to promulgate an OADT. One 
could imagine the sort of anticompetitiveness findings that would be neces-
sary to support an OADT. In a smart electricity network, for example, con-
sumers with smart meters could contract with aggregators (firms that bundle 
together demand reductions from a number of consumers and offer the result-
ing demand response resources into wholesale markets) to monetize their demand 
reductions, but these firms face regulatory hurdles that hamper their 
growth.206 At some point, FERC would make a foundational finding that it 
was time to remove the obstacles to more widespread use of this or any other 
resource by consumers on the distribution lines. 
If FERC were to proceed in this fashion, it would have to find that 
utilities have engaged in undue discrimination against those nonincumbents 
seeking to use the distribution lines to buy or sell electricity (consumers, for 
example). But this may not be as difficult a burden as one might imagine. 
FERC is not required to compile particularized factual findings and can re-
201. Clark Evans Downs &Kenneth B. Driver, Can The FERG Lawfally Order Transmission Providers To 
Participate In An ISO? Will It Anyway? 12 (1998), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/ 
Papers/Old_Papers/Downs_FERCLawfull 998.pdf (discussing this with reference to Order 888). 
202. Id at 12-13. 
203. FERC Order No. 888, supra note 3, at 21,54 7-48 (discussing the American Electric Power case 
involving undue discrimination). 
204. FERC Order 888, supra note 3, at 21,593. 
205. FERC Order 888, supra note 3. 
206. Eisen, supra note 140, at 84. 
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ly on an industry-wide assessment of behavior that amounts to undue dis-
crimination.207 
b. Necessary Regulatory Prerequisites 
Like regulatory evolution in telephone service, FERC's actions to pro-
vide open access to the interstate transmission of electricity took place after 
more than a decade of experience with public policies designed to change the 
electric grid. Order 888 and Order 2000 followed federal statutes (notably 
the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURP A)208 and the Energy 
Policy Act of 1992209) that encouraged alternatives to traditional incumbent utili-
ties. These laws led to the creation of a class of would-be competitors to utilities 
(wholesale generators). But these wholesale generators still lacked one essen-
tial element of success: the ability to move their electricity on the grid, which 
was stymied by the monopoly power of transmission owners.210 
Policies currently gaining traction in the states-net metering and de-
mand response,211 for example-have had similarly significant effects in 
prompting the rise of alternatives to traditional utilities, despite the utilities' 
ongoing opposition.212 Yet none of them do enough to reverse the historical 
biases in the system. Existing legal and regulatory systems tilt strongly in fa-
vor of incumbent utilities and pose significant hurdles for companies such as 
207. An example of this is the discussion of FERC's findings to support Order 888 in the D.C. 
Circuit opinion upholding that Order. Transmission Access Pol'y Study Grp. v. FERC, 225 
F.3d 667, 687 (D.C. Cir. 2000), aff don other grounds sub nom; New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 
(2002) (supporting FERC's reliance on generic findings of undue discrimination over 
opponents' objections that "substantial evidence of contemporaneous 'unjust, unreasonable, 
unduly discriminatory or preferential' behavior" was required). One critic of recent FERC 
initiatives acknowledges FERC's ability to make industry-wide findings of undue 
discrimination, but criticizes its use in specific contexts. Matthew R. McGuire, (Mis)understanding 
"Undue Discrimination": FERC's Misguided Effort to Extend the Boundaries ef the Federal Power 
Act, l 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 549 (2012). 
208. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978). 
209. Energy Policy Act of1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992). 
210. FERC Order 888, supra note 3, at 21,568. 
211. U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, BENEffiS OF DEMAND RESPONSE IN ELECTRICI1Y MARKETS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACHIEVING THEM, at v (2006), available at http://energy.gov/sites/ 
prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/DOE_Benefits_of_Demand_Response_in_Electricity_M 
arkets_and_Recommendations_for_Achieving_Them_Report_to_Congress.pdf ("Demand 
response is a tariff or program established to motivate changes in electric use by end-use 
customers in response to changes in the price of electricity over time, or to give incentive 
payments designed to induce lower electricity use at times of high market prices or when grid 
reliability is jeopardized."). 
212. Supra notes 62-66. 
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solar services firms that might seek to be network participants.213 The firms 
also face diseconomies of scale and high coordination problems, prompting 
commentators to argue that the federal government needs to take dramatic 
action to support renewables industries.214 It already has, with FERC's Order 
1000 prompting a planning process to build transmission lines to transport 
electricity generated from wind or solar from its source to a customer base.215 
Yet even if renewables firms were able to gain market share, the regulatory ac-
tions taken to date are largely meant to prompt the development and deploy-
ment of technology, not to set network rules for open access at the 
distribution level. 
FERC's landmark Order 1000, which establishes regional and interre-
gional planning for new transmission lines, provides for the development of 
new methodologies to allocate the costs of new transmission lines and pro-
motes development of transmission lines by parties other than incumbent 
transmission line owners.216 Order lOOO's dry language masks the fundamen-
tal change this rule may bring in overhauling the generation mix on the elec-
tric grid by linking electricity generated from renewable resources to the 
existing grid.217 
Similarly, FERC Order 7 45218 calls for participants to bid aggregated 
amounts of demand response into wholesale markets and receive the same 
prevailing price as generators receive for their electricity. In the aggregate, it 
also can serve as a resource that grid operators can use to meet demand, rather 
than calling on existing power plants.219 Recognizing this, Order 745 requires 
compensation of a demand response bid as a resource into wholesale markets 
at the full locational marginal price. Order 745's ultimate fate is in doubt af-
213. See Eisen, supra note 71 (discussing distribution-level barriers to more widespread deployment 
of renewable energy). 
214. Eisen, supra note 179 (arguing for "solar utilities"). 
215. See generally Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Interstate Transmission Challenges far 
Renewable Energy: A Federalism Mismatch, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1801 (2012). 
216. Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating Public 
Utilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 49842, 49880 (Aug. 11, 2011) [hereinafter FERC Order 1000] (to be 
codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35); see Klass & Wilson, supra note 215. 
217. See, e.g., Adam James & Whitney Allen, FERG Order 1000: The Most Exciting Energy Regulation 
You've Never Heard ef,CLIMATEPROGRESS (Oct. 22, 2012, 11:30 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/ 
climate/2012/10/22/1059091/ferc-order-1000-the-most-exciting-energy-regulation-youve-
never-heard-of. 
218. Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets, 76 Fed. Reg. 
16658 (Mar. 24, 2011) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). 
219. Eisen, supra note 140, at 77-78. 
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ter a D.C. Circuit panel decision invalidating it,220 although a request for re-
hearing is pending. But if it is eventually upheld, some observers believe that 
Order 7 45 may spur dramatic growth in demand response deployment and 
set an important precedent to include resources beyond traditional generating 
capacity on the Smart Grid, including benefits such as greenhouse gas emis-
sions reductions.221 
c. Risks in Relying on the Model 
The principal risk that FERC would encounter in promulgating an 
OADT based on open access transmission principles is that it lacks statutory 
authority over retail sales of electricity. Under Section 201 of the FPA, 
FERC's authority extends to "the transmission of electric energy in interstate 
commerce and the sale of such energy at wholesale in interstate commerce."222 
In the restructuring Orders, FERC was acting to create wholesale markets 
and open the transmission lines, not to regulate the retail distribution of elec-
tricity, which has been the states' responsibility. This jurisdictional dividing 
line is anything but clear223 and has been the subject of tension for well over 
two decades. Indeed, concerns about FERC authority suggest that promul-
gating an OADT might push FERC's jurisdiction beyond its current limits. 
FERC's recent assertions of regulatory authority over the electric grid 
are already being challenged in high-profile lawsuits attacking Orders 745 
and 1000. Decisions in these cases will go a long way toward determining 
whether FERC would face jurisdictional risk if it were to promulgate an 
OADT. The first lawsuit is a consolidated challenge to Order 1000, which to 
many involves a "significant shift in FER C's view of its jurisdiction."224 In the 
220. Elec. Power Supply Ass'n v. FERC, No. 11-1486 (D.C. Cir. May 23, 2014);Joel B. Eisen, 
D. C. Circuit Vacates FERG Smart Grid 'Demand Response" Rule, CPR Blog, Legal Planet (May 
30, 2014), http:/ /legal-planet.org/2014/05/30/ guest-blogger-joel-eisen-d-c-circuit-vacates-
ferc-smart-grid-demand-respo nse-rule/. 
221. Eisen, supra note 140, at 71; Rasika Athawale, Demand Response in the US Electricity Market, THE 
ENERGY COLLECTNE (Mar. 7, 2013), http://theenergycollective.com/rasika-athawale/195536/ 
demand-response-us-electricity-market. 
222. 16 u.s.c. §824 (2012). 
223. Linda L. Walsh & Noelle J. Coates, Walking the Fuzzy Bright Line, PUB. UTIL. FORT. 
40, 43 (Sept. 2013), http://www.hunton.com/files/Publication/27eb7751-6e4e-4822-bdc4 
-Odd7 532ce57 e/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ a 76c02b2-4f91-4801-b3f4d073c 
97d64ee/Walking_the_Fuzzy _Bright_Line.pdf ("In matters of transmission, that [jurisdiction 
boundary] line's location has always been a bit fuzzy."). 
224. McGuire, supra note 207. 
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lawsuit pending in the D.C. Circuit,225 FERC's opponents raise a number of 
jurisdictional objections. For example, one centers on Order lOOO's removal 
of the right of first refusal (ROFR) for transmission projects identified in a 
regional plan for the purposes of cost allocation.226 As a result of Order 1000, 
incumbent utilities will no longer have the right of first refusal to build, own, 
and operate large-scale transmission projects located within their service ter-
ritory. In the past, transmission projects have traditionally been assigned 
based upon geographic location and service territory.227 Without an ROFR, 
these may now be open to competition. FERC's stated basis for removal of 
the ROFR is that it is attempting to encourage nontraditional investment by 
removing obstacles to nonincumbent developers of transmission lines. In 
other words, FERC used the undue discrimination standard of FP A Section 
206 to conclude that the ROFR has stymied the ability of new entrants in the 
transmission business.228 
One commentator argues that this is a significant expansion ofFERC's 
undue discrimination authority because "[ t ]he problem of independent com-
panies seeking to invest in and construct transmission lines in the footprint of 
traditional electric utilities was not envisioned at the time the tariffs were filed 
with FERC."229 Others point to a direct conflict with state regulatory author-
ity in that "[s]tates have traditionally assumed all jurisdiction to approve or 
deny permits for the siting and construction of electric transmission facili-
ties."230 While the fate of the Order 1000 lawsuit is unclear, the Supreme 
Court has already upheld FERC's authority to promote a class of competitors 
to incumbents, even if it threatens to interfere with matters traditionally re-
225. South Carolina Public Service Authorityv. FERC No. 12-1232 (D.C. Cir. filed May 25, 2012); Alice 
Clamp, The Trouble With Order 1000, Pull. POWER (June 6, 2013), http:/ /publicpower.org/Media/ 
magazine/ ArticleDetail.cfm?ItemNumber=3806 7 (describing the litigation). 
226. FERC Order 1000, supra note 216, at 49,880. 
227. Greg Stark, Why FERG Order 1000 is a Big Deal in the Electric Industry, ENERDYNAMICS 
(Nov. 30, 2012), http://blog.enerdynarnics.com/2012/11/30/why-ferc-order-1000-is-a-big-deal-in-
the-electric-industry. 
228. FERC Order 1000, supra note 216, at 49,880 ('We conclude these reforms are necessary in 
order to eliminate practices that have the potential to undermine the identification and 
evaluation of more efficient or cost-effective alternatives to regional transmission needs, which 
in turn can result in rates for Commission-jurisdictional services that are unjust and 
unreasonable, or otherwise result in undue discrimination by public utility transmission 
providers."); see also Statement ef Chairman Jon Wellingheff on Right ef First RefUsal (ROFR) Orders, 
FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N (July 19, 2012), http://www.ferc.gov/ 
EventCalendar/Files/ 20120719164044-E-11-WELLINGHOFF.pdf. 
229. McGuire, supra note 207, at 589. 
230. Walsh &Coates, supra note 223, at 43. 
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served to the states. In New York v. FERG,231 the Court upheld the restruc-
turing Orders as a valid exercise of FERC's FPA authority to address anti-
competitive, discriminatory behavior on an industry-wide basis if it relates to 
transmission service on the interconnected electric grid.232 
New York v. FERG also makes it clear that even if FERC policies have 
impacts at the retail level, if the transmission grid is affected, it may regulate 
activity that involves interstate transmission. As the Court stated in New 
York, "[N]o statutory language limits FERC's transmission jurisdiction to the 
wholesale market, although the statute does limit FERC's sales jurisdiction to 
that market."233 This suggests that FERC's authority over transmission at all 
levels of the existing interconnected transmission grid may justify an OADT. 
Using this logic, FERC would assert that an OADT is remedying discrimi-
nation that has the effect of precluding providers of products and services 
from access to the transmission network. But it would have to overcome the 
language in New York that limits FERC's authority to interstate transmission 
and not to retail sales. This, as noted above, might require amendments to 
theFPA. 
A second ongoing test of FERC's authority is EPSA v. FERG,234 the 
challenge to Order 745. Order 745's concept of compensating negawatts (re-
ductions in consumption) on a level playing field with megawatts generated 
has been controversial.235 In EPSA v. FERG, a broad coalition of states and 
industry associations claimed in part that FERC overstepped its authority as 
the wholesale markets' regulator, controlling a matter subject to exclusive 
states' jurisdiction.236 FERC justified Order 745 under FPA Section 205's 
grant of authority to it over matters "affecting or pertaining to" wholesale 
prices.237 FERC therefore claimed it has authority to regulate DR in part because 
231. 535 U.S. 1 (2002). 
232. Eisen, supra note 140, at 94-95. 
233. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002). 
234. No. 11-1486 (D.C. Cir. filed June 6, 2012). 
235. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., A Primer on Demand Response and a Critique ef FERG Order 745, 3 J. 
ENERGY &ENVTL. L.102 (2012). 
236. Elec. Power Supply Ass'n v. FERC, No. 11-1486 (D.C. Cir. May 23, 2014); see also Bobby 
McMahon, Federal judges Hear Arguments on US FERG Demand Response Order, PLATTS 
MCGRAW HILL FINANCIAL (Sept. 23, 2013, 4:12 PM), http://www.platts.com/latest-
news/electric-power/washington/federal-judges-hear-argurnents-on-us-ferc-demand-21595334 
(noting the clash over jurisdiction at oral argument of EPSA v. FERC); Bruce W. Radford &Michael 
T. Burr, Federal Feud: The jurisdictional Battle Rages on, U'ith FERG and EPA Squaring Off Against the 
States, Pull. UTIL. FORT., Nov. 2012, at 30, 31 ("In this case, we force the court to decide just what is 
the boundary between federal and state jurisdiction, ... Most cases tend to nibble around it, 
but with this one the issue is front and center." (quoting John Sheik, EPSA's president and CEO)). 
237. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2012); Eisen, supra note 140, at 72. 
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of its significant and wide-ranging impacts on wholesale markets (for exam-
ple, by tamping demand at peak hours and decreasing the need for grid opera-
tors to call up reserve generation capacity).238 
In May 2014, a panel of the D.C. Circuit split 2-1 rejected this assertion 
of jurisdiction, vacating Order 745 and terming demand response a retail-level 
product subject to exclusive state authority.239 If this decision stands, it will be dif-
ficult for FERC to set rules for many products and services that could be 
viewed as retail-level and subject to state regulation.24° For that reason, 
FERC would have no authority to take the broader action of promulgating an 
OADT, unless Congress amended the FPA to give it that power. At this 
moment, it appears likely that FERC will seek rehearing en bane at the D.C. 
Circuit. If Order 745 is eventually upheld, and FERC can regulate DR bid 
into wholesale electricity markets, then it will have the beginnings of a foun-
dation to interpret existing statutory authority to establish an OADT. 
The expected physical or economic linkage of smart electricity network 
infrastructure and applications nationwide may give FERC more justification 
to act. On a network where multimodal, multidirectional transactions are 
contemplated, the division of regulatory authority may not be reducible to 
simply articulating retail versus wholesale jurisdictional boundaries between 
the federal and state governments and walling off separate spheres of regula-
tory influence. FERC could extend its interpretation of section 205 to the 
OADT, contending that consumers offering electricity for sale across the nation 
significantly affect the wholesale markets. Using the logic of City if Arlington 
v. FCC,241 FERC could be entitled to Chevron242 deference for a finding that 
its authority to regulate matters affecting the wholesale markets extends to 
the development of an OADT. In the near term, however, unless the panel 
238. Elec. Power Supply Ass'n v. FERC, No. 11-1486, at 7. As has been observed in another 
context, FERC's authority gives it considerable discretion "to consider some matters going 
beyond the direct financial interests of buyers and sellers in wholesale transactions [such as] 
'conservation, environmental, and antitrust questions."' Michael H. Dworkin & Rachel Aslin 
Goldwasser, Ensuring Consideration ef the Public Interest in the Governance and Accountability ef 
Regional Transmission Organizations, 28 ENERGY L.J. 543, 545 (2007) (quoting NAACP v. 
Fed. Power Comm'n, 425 U.S. 662 (1976)). 
239. Elec. Power Supply Ass'n v. FERC, No.11-1486. 
240. Eisen, supra note 220. 
241. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013) (using Chevron to uphold the FCC's interpretation 
of its jurisdiction, and rejecting a challenge to that construction on the basis that it intruded 
impermissibly into matters of exclusive state jurisdiction). 
242. Chevron U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467U.S. 837 (1984) (providing a 
two-step test for a court to use in deciding whether to defer to an agency's construction of a statute it 
administers). Of course, Chevron has been the subject of an extensive body ofliterature, and 
the actual application to this hypothetical context is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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decision in Electric Power Supply Association is overturned, the jurisdictional 
uncertainty is the most significant risk highlighted by the electricity restruc-
turing model.243 
Still another risk that FERC faces is that unlike the breakup of the Bell 
System in telecommunications, restructuring has not left the electric utility 
industry with a predisposition to deregulate. Exactly the opposite is true in 
parts of the nation where restructuring never took hold, with many states return-
ing to principles of traditional regulation. To avoid disruptive jurisdictional 
clashes in the near term, the history of restructuring suggests that moving the 
concept of expanded distribution access forward may be best achieved 
through a joint effort instead of an outright assertion of authority. This 
would entail FERC involving state regulators in the national conversation to 
decide how best to advance an OADT. 
C. The Finance System Model (Dodd-Frank) 
The third and final model involves the comprehensive regulation overhaul of 
the nation's financial system embodied in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank).244 The financial crisis of the 
Great Recession, at the heart of which was a banking meltdown in 2008-2009, 
led to widespread changes in the nation's financial regulatory infrastructure. 
This Part will discuss a high-profile Dodd-Frank reform measure: the 
creation of the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection(CFPB)245 to safeguard 
243. The battle over "net neutrality" on the Internet, another area where national network law and 
policy is rapidly evolving, presents a cautionary tale to FERC about extending its interpretation of its 
jurisdiction to promote open access. Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 
2 J. TELECOMM. &HIGH TECH. L. 141 (2003) (introducing the concept of"net neutrality"). 
Professor Wu argued for the Internet to be neutral; that is, to provide open access to all 
applications and avoid promoting any one application over others. In early 2014, the D.C. 
Circuit decided that FCC does not have authority under section 706 of the 
Telecommunications Act of1996 to require net neutrality. Veriwn v. FCC, Nos. 11-1355, 
11-1356, 2014 WL 113946 (D.C. Cir. Tan. 14, 2014). It should be noted that section 706 
confers less specific authority on the FCC to regulate market transactions than the FP A does 
on FERC, so the net neutrality decision is unlikely to have impact in proceedings involving 
open access on the electric grid. 
244. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat.1376 (2010). 
245. Title X of Dodd-Frank establishes the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (CFPB) as 
an independent agency within the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 12 
U.S.C. § 5491 (2012) (defining the Bureau and listing its duties); 12 U.S.C. § 5581(b) (2012) 
(transferring certain consumer protection responsibilities to the CFPB); 12 U.S.C. § 558l(a)(l) 
(2012) (defining "consumer financial protection functions" to mean "all authority to prescribe 
rules or issue orders or guidelines pursuant to any Federal consumer financial law, including 
performing appropriate functions to promulgate and review such rules, orders, and guidelines"). 
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consumers against abuses by financial services firms. As some commentators 
have noted, the CFPB is arguably the most important federal administrative 
agency created from scratch in recent memory.246 Its creation involved a debate 
over fundamental questions of how to design an agency's jurisdiction to accom-
plish a specific set of purposes. Many commentators have written about this 
development,247 and the analysis here can only scratch the surface of the im-
mense and ongoing public policy debate involving the CFPB. 
1. The Appeal of the Financial System Model 
Dodd-Frank seeks to prevent another major financial crisis by creating 
new regulatory processes that enforce transparency and accountability while 
implementing rules for consumer protection.248 There are some intriguing 
similarities that make this regulatory overhaul worthy of further considera-
tion. Like the electricity and telecommunications networks, the financial sys-
tem and the regulatory structure that governs it are a massive interconnected 
web that is essential to national welfare. Two principal animating concerns 
for financial system reform-minimizing the probability of financial sector 
distress by making it possible to liquidate banks deemed "too big to fail;"249 
and guarding against systemic mortgage difficulties through CFPB-are 
comparable to the need to maintain the electric grid's reliability and security 
during any transformation to a smart network. Dodd-Frank's series of policy 
choices holds has important lessons for regulation of the electric grid. 
246. Kent Barnett, Codijj;ing Chevmore, N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (noting that in 
creating the CFPB, "Congress reorganized much of the administrative state as it related to 
consumer financial protection"); Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture 
Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 18 (2010) (terming the CFPB "the most 
important federal agency created in decades"). 
24 7. See, e.g., id.; Jared Elosta, Dynamic Federalism and Consumer Financial Protection: How the 
Dodd-FrankAct Changes the Preemption Debate, 89 N.C. L. REV.1273 (2011). For discussions 
of broader administrative law themes involved in the CFPB's creation, see Barnett, supra note 
246; Emily Hammond Meazell, Presidential Control, Expertise, and the Deference Dilemma, 61 
DUKE L.J. 1763, 1792-93 (2012) [hereinafter Hammond Meazell]. 
248. Jeff Merkley & Carl Levin, The Dodd-Frank Act Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and 
Conflicts cf Interest: New Tools to Address Evolving Threats, 48 HARV.]. ON LEGIS. 515, 515 (2011) 
("Congress responded to this financial crisis by enacting the broadest financial reforms since 
the 1930s. These reforms, which constitute the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act ... seek to protect: (1) the U.S. economy from suffering another 
debilitating financial crisis; and (2) taxpayers from again being called upon to rescue failed 
financial firms.") 
249. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon and Christopher Muller, Conftonting Financial Crisis: Dodd-Frank's 
Dangers and the Case far a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 YALE]. ON REG. 151 (2011). 
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Financial regulation before Dodd-Frank featured a lack of clarity about 
jurisdiction of various federal agencies to address consumer protection.250 
There was a widespread perception that the accretion of new laws and regula-
tions over time in response to major adverse events (in this case, systemic financial 
crises) was a major contributor to a regulatory structure with numerous gaps 
and inconsistencies.251 Indeed, observers cited these gaps in regulation as a 
major shortcoming of the system before Dodd-Frank, one that in some cases 
exacerbated the financial problems of the Great Recession.252 The new com-
plex regulatory structure of Dodd-Frank, including the creation of the CFPB, 
aims to address some of these gaps. 
The CFPB aims to protect consumer interests while simultaneously re-
taining the ability of financial services firms to offer new products and ser-
vices.253 This has resonance in FERC's potential to use its authority in the 
electric grid to accomplish similar objectives. The specific substantive deci-
sions about this balance are obviously different from those encountered in the 
electric grid. But when one contemplates extending authority to a federal 
agency to protect consumers while encouraging new industry entrants, it re-
sembles inquiries that will be encountered in the development of a smart elec-
tricity network. Thus, the central questions about allocating power to the 
CFPB to strike the balance between industry and consumers have some reso-
nance to regulation of the electric grid. 
Another important issue raised by the CFPB's creation has an even more 
obvious parallel to the electric grid: the resolution of the overlapping authori-
ty that existed before Dodd-Frank between state and federal governments 
with respect to protecting financial services firms' consumers. As noted 
above, the discussion of creating a new consumer financial protection agency 
frequently addressed this issue,254 and that discussion may have important les-
250. WEBEL ET AL., supra note 233, at 10 (terming the pre- Dodd-Frank system of consumer 
protection "fragmented"). 
251. Id at 10. "Currently, the United States has many regulators, some with overlapping jurisdictions, 
but with gaps in oversight of some issues. This structure evolved largely in reaction to past 
financial crises, with new agencies and rules created to address the perceived causes of the 
particular financial problems at that time." Id at Summary. 
252. Id at 4 ("[S]ome analysts argue that systemic risk can fester in the gaps in the regulatory 
system where one regulator's jurisdiction ends and another's begins."). 
253. U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, A NEW FOUNDATION: 
REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 57-58 (2009) (calling for the 
consumer protection agency to ensure that "consumers are protected from abuse, unfairness, 
deception, or discrimination" and that "consumer financial services markets operate fairly and 
efficiently with ample room for sustainable growth and innovation"). 
254. See supra notes 243-245 and accompanying text. 
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sons for the current difficulties in drawing the state-federal jurisdictional line 
in electricity regulation. 
Still another parallel between the two systems is a somewhat unfortunate 
one: sweeping financial regulatory change is often crisis-driven. The financial 
industry is susceptible to a historical recurrence of systemic crises, such as the 
near-collapse of the banking system in the Great Depression.255 And crisis has 
prompted action: the Glass-Steagall Act, Securities Act of 1933, the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 in the Great Depression era,256 as well as the Dodd-
Frank Act today. Similarly, recurring crises have historically been a driver of 
major change in the electric utility industry, with new laws and policies fol-
lowing the blackouts of 1965, 1977 and 2003257 (for example, reliability 
standards authority added to the FPA after the 2003 blackout).258 Therefore, 
the lessons learned from how financial regulation evolves in response to crises 
may have some resonance for the electric grid. 
2. Regulatory Evolution Leading to the Creation of the CFPB 
With the caveat that there are significant differences between financial 
system regulatory reform and the electric grid, this Part discusses the creation 
of the CFPB, which is "charged with the Herculean task of regulating the fi-
nancial services industry to protect consumers."259 Specifically, it must ensure 
"that markets for consumer financial products and services are fair, transparent, 
and competitive."260 In 2007, then-Harvard Law School professor Elizabeth 
Warren first proposed an agency of this type,261 and the cataclysmic financial 
distress of the Great Recession led to a widespread political call to establish a 
consumer protection agency.262 One primary motivation for this was the percep-
255. Markus K. Brunnermeier & Martin Oehmke, Bubbles, Financial Crises, and Systemic Risk 8 (Nat'! 
Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18398, 2012), available at http://www.nber.org/ 
papers/wl8398. 
256. Merkley &Levin, supra note 248, at 516. 
25 7. For summaries of these three major cataclysmic events, see Brent Barker, Game Changer, Pull. POWER 
(June 11, 2013), available at http://publicpower.org/Media/magazine/ArticleDetail.cfm?Item 
Number =38099; Great Northeast Blackout, BLACKOUT HIST. PROJECT (June 27, 2000), 
http://blackout.gm1Ledu/events/tl1965.html; New York Blackout, BLACKOUT HIST. PROJECT (June 
27, 2000), http://blackout.gmu.edu/ eventsltll 977.html 
258. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 824o(a)(2), (c)(l) (2012). Under this section, FERC approves reliability 
standards that the Electric Reliability Organization (ERO) develops and submits to it. 
259. Barkow, supra note 246, at 18. 
260. 12 u.s.c. § 5511 (2012). 
261. Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate: If It's Good Enough for Microwaves, It's Good Enough for 
Mortgages, DEMOCRACY, Summer 2007, at 8. 
262. Barkow, supra note 246, at 72. 
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tion of inaction by the Federal Reserve and others in the face of warnings that 
risky mortgage products had become "a threat both to homeowners and to the 
financial system .... "263 Of course, the link between mortgage issues and the 
overall distress of the financial system in 2008 and thereafter has been widely 
documented.264 
To address this problem, there were "extensive efforts to understand 
how it was possible that consumer lending by the nation's largest banks, di-
rectly, and through a variety of business fronts, went essentially unregulated 
during the period from 2003-2008, particularly in the area of home mortgages, 
the world's largest single financial market."265 This regulatory failure and the 
idea of establishing a new system of consumer protection reform in financial 
services were debated widely in numerous high-profile fora. 266 In response, 
Dodd-Frank established the CFPB to ensure that "consumers are provided 
with timely and understandable information to make responsible decisions 
about financial transactions" and to protect consumers "from unfair, deceptive, or 
abusive acts and practices."267 
One primary impetus for the CFPB's creation was a perception that pro-
tecting consumers was not a primary objective of financial regulation and 
took a back seat in regulators' perspectives to ensuring the soundness of the 
financial system.268 Another problem was that fragmented regulatory author-
263. Legislative Proposals to Reform the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Hearing Before the H 
Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit, 113th Cong. 2 (2013) (statement of Damon A. 
Silvers, Policy Director and Special Counsel, American Federation of Labor and Congress of 
Industrial Organizations). 
264. See, e.g., Dan Caplinger, Understanding the CFPB's New Mortgage Rules: Keeping You Sqfe From Tricky 
Loans, DAILY FINANCE (Jan. 24, 2014, 12:50 PM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2014/01/24/ 
understanding-the-cfpbs-new-mortgage-rules-keeping-you-safe-fr ("The worst financial 
crisis in generations resulted from a relatively simple problem: Millions of homeowners 
overextended themselves by borrowing more than they could afford, with the aid and 
encouragement of the banks. That helped artificially inflate home prices, and eventually led to 
a price collapse and a wave of mortgage defaults that brought the banking system to the brink 
of collapse."). 
265. Legislative Proposals to Reform the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Hearing Before the H 
Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit, 113th Cong. 1 (2013) (statement of Damon A. 
Silvers, Policy Director and Special Counsel, American Federation of Labor and Congress of 
Industrial Organizations). 
266. Id at 1-2 (noting that this was the subject of "hearings in both houses of Congress, by the 
Congressional Oversight Panel for TARP as part of its mandate from Congress to make 
recommendations for regulatory reform, by the Congressionally mandated Financial Crisis 
Inquiry Commission, and in numerous academic and think tank studies"). 
267. Barkow, supra note 246, at 72 (quoting Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, Pub. L. No.111-203, 124 Stat.1376 (2010)). 
268. Id at 72-73; Barnett, supra note 246, at 29; see also Legislative Proposals to Reform the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau: Hearing Before the H Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit, 
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ity aimed at protecting consumers from abuses in financial services allowed 
gaps that enabled abuses to proliferate.269 As one economist testified before a 
hearing on the House proposal to establish a consumer protection agency: 
It is also clear that the current fractured regulatory framework 
overseeing consumer financial protection is wholly inadequate. 
Much of the most egregious mortgage lending during the housing 
bubble earlier in the decade was done by financial firms whose cor-
porate structures were designed specifically to fall between the reg-
ulatory cracks. There is no way to end the regulatory arbitrage in 
the regulatory framework. The framework itself must be funda-
mentally changed.270 
Before Dodd-Frank, numerous federal agencies regulated consumer 
credit and lending, including the Federal Reserve, Office of Comptroller of 
the Currency, Office of Thrift Supervision, Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion, and Federal Trade Commission (FTC).271 As an example of this, before 
Dodd-Frank, the Federal Reserve had rulemaking authority to implement 
the consumer protection laws, including the Truth in Lending Act, and the 
FTC had enforcement authority.272 
The legislative solution aimed to consolidate regulatory authority in a 
single agency to deal with consumer financial protection,273 as Professor Warren 
had advocated. Proposals in the major financial regulatory reform bills advanced 
in both the House and Senate sought establishment of such an agency.274 
113th Cong. 3 (2013) (statement of Damon A. Silvers, Policy Director and Special Counsel, 
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations) (noting that with 
reform, "consumer protection would no longer be the stepchild of financial regulation"). 
269. Barnett, supra note 246, at 29-30; Experts' Perspectives on Systemic Risk and Resolution Issues: 
Hearing Before the H Comm. on Fin. Servs., lllth Cong. 40 (2009) (statement of Mark Zandi, 
Chief Economist and Co-founder, Moody's Economy.com). 
270. Id 
271. Leonard J. Kennedy, Patricia A. McCoy & Ethan Bernstein, The Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau: Financial Regulation far the Twenty-First Century, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 
1141, 1145-46 (2012) (discussing the redistribution of agency power in the creation of the CFPB); 
The Dodd-FrankAct: How States and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Will Work Together to 
Protect Consumers, CONSUMER FED'N OF AM., http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/Fact 
%20Sheet%20CFPB%20and%20theo/o20Stateso/o20Novo/o202010%20_3_.pdf. 
272. Barnett, supra note 246, at 29; WEBEL ET AL., supra note 251, at 10. 
273. Id at Summary ("Another option would be to remove regulatory authority on a particular 
topic from the multiple agencies that might address it within their area now, and establish a 
single agency to address that issue. For instance, a single consumer financial protection agency 
... could be created."). 
274. Compare H.R. 4173, lllth Cong.§ 4101 (2009) (establishing a "Consumer Fmancial Protection 
Agency" as an independent agency), with S. 3217, lllth Cong.§ 101l(a) (2010) (establishing 
the CFPB within the Federal Reserve). 
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These proposals differed in various respects, one of which was the agency's location 
within the existing regulatory landscape. The House bill would have created 
a freestanding regulatory agency, while the Senate bill, which eventually became 
the basis for the CFPB's institutional framework, established the CFPB as a 
new agency in the Federal Reserve System.275 The debate over which of these 
obviously diverging policy paths to take was "hotly contested,'' and the prospect 
of agency capture by the financial industry (particularly if the consumer pro-
tection function was lodged within the existing structure) was an "obvious 
concern."276 But strenuous opposition from financial services companies and 
their powerful trade associations against a freestanding new agency on the ba-
sis that regulation of consumer protection and security of the financial system 
could not be handled separately derailed the House proposal.277 
Another important issue that arose in the creation of the CFPB was the 
scope of the new agency's authority to promulgate new federal rules.278 The 
prospect that the new agency would make new rules, rather than simply enforcing 
existing ones more vigorously, led some industry interests to claim that it 
would hamper the competitiveness of financial services firms.279 One formu-
lation of this dilemma was that the new agency "must strike the appropriate 
balance between underregulating, which will result in bad lending that pushes 
too many households toward bankruptcy or foreclosure, and overregulating, 
which will stifle innovation, restrict credit for creditworthy borrowers, and 
lead to higher costs for all consumers."280 
275. 12 U.S.C. § 5491 (2012); WEBEL ET AL., supra note 251, at 11 (describing the differences 
between the House and Senate proposals and noting that in the Senate bill, "rather than 
creating a new, free-standing regulatory agency like in H.R. 4173, the Bureau would be 
established within the Federal Reserve System."). See generally Hammond Meazell, supra note 
247, at 1792 (discussing the risks inherent in this structure ofinteragency relationships). 
276. Barnett, supra note 246, at 37; Barkow, supra note 246, at 72; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The 
Dodd-Frank Act's Expansion ef State Authority to Protect Consumers ef Financial Services, 36 J. 
CORP. L. 893, 951 (2011) (observing that "Congress designed CFPB to be especially resistant 
to capture by the financial services industry, because members of Congress and analysts agreed 
that the industry had exercised excessive influence over bank regulators during the period 
leading up to the financial crisis"). 
277. Id at 73. 
278. Id at 74 (noting that the choice was whether the CFPB would have "independent rulemaking 
authority or if it would merely be an enforcement body that policed rules enacted by existing 
banking regulators"). 
279. Experts' Perspectives on Systemic Risk and Resolution Issues: Hearing Before the H Comm. on Fin. 
Servs., lllth Cong. 40 (2009) (statement of Mark Zandi, Chief Economist and Co-founder, 
Moody' sEconomy.com). 
280. Id at 116 (written testimony of Mark Zandi, Chief Economist and Co-founder, Moody's 
Economy.com). 
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In the end, Dodd-Frank specified that the CFPB has independent 
rulemaking authority.281 One principal focus of the agency's new rules has 
been on mortgage lenders' standards of conduct. An example is the 2013 
Ability to Repay Rule, which implements Sections 1411 and 1412 of Dodd-
Frank, that require creditors to make a "reasonable, good faith determination 
of a consumer's ability to repay any consumer credit transaction secured by a 
dwelling (excluding an open-end credit plan, timeshare plan, reverse mort-
gage, or temporary loan),'' and "establishes certain protections from liability 
under this requirement for 'qualified mortgages."'282 The CFPB's rules are 
not subject to approval by the Federal Reserve or any other agency. Under the 
new law, the CFPB is "the only agency authorized to apply, enforce, interpret 
or administer the provisions of ... Federal consumer financial law."283 There 
are, however, two checks on its rulemaking. First, the CFPB must consult 
with the Federal Reserve and other regulators that guarantee the financial 
system's safety before making rules. The Financial Stability Oversight Coun-
cil, another new entity created in Dodd-Frank, provides a further check on 
the CFPB's work, as it may invalidate CFPB rules that threaten the financial 
system's safety.284 
The proposal to give the CFPB new regulatory authority also sparked 
federalism concerns. Before Dodd-Frank, multiple federal agencies shared 
oversight of consumer credit and lending with state attorneys general and 
banking and credit regulators.285 Consumer advocates fought to retain a role 
for the states in consumer protection, arguing that "states should also be able 
to play their traditional role as first responders if abuses emerge that are not 
yet addressed by or fall in a gap in federal consumer protection rules."286 Fi-
nancial services firms, by contrast, sought preemption of state laws.287 Section 
1041 of Dodd-Frank adopts a floor preemption approach. Federal law 
preempts state law only ifit is inconsistent with a federal consumer protection 
281. 12 u.s.c. § 5512(b)(4) (2012). 
282. Ability-to-Repay and Qialified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending Act 
(Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 35,430, 35,497, 35,501 Oune 12, 2013) (to be codified at 12 
C.F.R. pt. 1026). 
283. 12 U.S.C. § 5512(b)(4)(B) (2012); see also Hammond Meazell, supra note 247, at 1792 
(contrasting this provision with the CFPB's oversight by the Financial Stability Oversight 
Council). 
284. 12 U.S.C. § 5513(a) (2012); see Hammond Meazell, supra note 247, at 1792. 
285. See Elosta, supra note 247, at 1302. 
286. LAUREN SAUNDERS, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., THE ROLE OF THE STATES UNDER 
THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 
2010, at 9 (2010). 
287. Barkow, supra note 246, at 75. 
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law, but an inconsistency does not include providing greater protection to a 
consumer.288 Over industry objections, the new law also gives state attorneys 
general the power to enforce Dodd-Frank's prohibition against unfair, decep-
tive, and abusive acts and practices, and to enforce CFPB regulations.289 
3. Lessons for a Smart Electricity Network 
a. Regulatory Lessons 
One lesson from the debate over the creation of the CFPB is that sweeping 
change in the regulation of an industry requires attention to fundamental 
questions of institutional design, jurisdiction, and functions.290 In particular, 
this is likely to be true in a situation where existing authority is perceived to be 
fragmented, replete with gaps, and not responsive to a major concern such as 
protecting consumers. As the development ofDodd-Frankindicates, the approach 
taken is unlikely to be simply a matter of closing the gaps with new regulatory au-
thority. The resistance of entrenched industry entities to dramatic regulatory 
overhaul proposals will often result in compromises that may yield a distribu-
tion of authority not previously foreseen by those who promoted regulatory reform. 
The CFPB' s regulatory institutional framework is unusual in modern times. 
Similarly, sweeping changes in electric grid regulation might require 
some creativity in institutional design. Perhaps, for example, rather than 
simply postulating the potential for an OADT, we may need to reexamine 
whether FERC is the appropriate entity to be promulgating it, at least as cur-
rently constituted. It may appear at some point in time that FERC has sub-
ordinated the interests of advancing a smart electricity network to promoting 
other objectives (such as the grid's stability, comparable to the system of fi-
nancial regulation before Dodd-Frank). At that point in time, Congress 
might move or reorganize the consumer-facing programs of FERC into a 
new entity and establish new authority that would in turn centralize responsi-
bility for advancing consumer interests and promulgating the OADT. 
A significant caveat is in order. The CFPB's establishment resulted in a 
new system of regulation of an entire industry and the creation of a web of 
288. 12 U.S.C. § 555l(a)(l)-(2) (2012). 
289. Id § 5552. 
290. See David A Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Why Who Does What Matters: Governmental 
Design, Agency Performance, the CFPB and PP ACA (Jan. 6, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with authors) (noting with respect to the CFPB how the specific combination of 
regulatory functions and purposes can affect agency decision-making). 
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new interagency relationships.291 This should make one cautious about extending 
the analogy too far between its creation and any conclusion that the OADT 
might not be possible under existing statutes and authority. Some of the most 
intriguing issues in designing and establishing the CFPB involved how complete-
ly new statutory authority should be designed to accomplish important and 
often contradictory objectives. That distinguishes it in part from electricity regula-
tion, where the central questions of federal agency jurisdiction relate to construing 
the authority of a single agency (FERC) to interpret its mandates under existing 
statutes. 
Still, many central concerns in both settings are the same, including a 
balance between protecting consumers and potentially hampering the ability 
of industry participants to create new products. One fundamental lesson 
from the CFPB's creation is that we must strike this balance through careful 
attention to regulatory design. If a new distribution of authority is necessary, 
it may take a new statute, akin to Title X of Dodd-Frank, to reach the requi-
site result. Another lesson is that attention must be paid to the potential for 
erosion of authority once it is believed to have been firmly established. In 
2013, for example, the House committee with jurisdiction over the CFPB 
held several hearings aimed at weakening the agency and featured agendas 
with such ominous sounding topics as "Legislative Proposals to Reform the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau."292 
The allocation of regulatory authority to preserve a federalism balance 
between the CFPB and state attorneys general also has important resonance 
for the creation of a smart electricity network. Like consumer protection law 
before Dodd-Frank, the states and federal government have a distinctly dif-
ferent, but at times overlapping, responsibility for protecting the interests of 
electric utility ratepayers. Creating a patchwork of individual state regulatory 
laws to advance the Smart Grid might hamper development of a national 
network.293 This in some respects is akin to the industry argument in Dodd-
Frank that preemption of state consumer protection laws was warranted because 
291. Hammond Meazell, supra note 247, at 1792. 
292. Legislative Proposals to Reform the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Hearing Before the H 
Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit, 113th Cong. 5 (2013) (statement of Damon A. 
Silvers, Policy Director and Special Counsel, American Federation of Labor and Congress of 
Industrial Organizations) ("Today, this Subcommittee takes up a series of measures-I believe 
nine bills-each of which is designed to weaken the CFPB, to deprive the CFPB of its status 
as a genuine bank regulator, and to effectively subordinate the CFPB to the too big to fail 
banks that dominate the markets the CFPB regulates."). 
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the alternative would make it difficult for financial services firms to compete 
and to develop new products and services.294 
Allowing states to retain substantial authority (enforcement authority 
and the floor preemption of retaining state laws tailored to the precise needs 
of individual states, 295 as long as they are not inconsistent with national laws) 
was important for securing states' support for Dodd-Frank. In both the 
Dodd-Frank setting and the electric grid, commentators have described the 
resulting situation as "dynamic federalism."296 Indeed, one recent commenta-
tor on the CFPB argues that Dodd-Frank promotes "an arrangement of gov-
ernance whereby overlapping authority and competition between state and 
federal regulators in the area of consumer financial protection has the poten-
tial to make the preemption dilemma much less problematic."297 This is an 
important lesson for the future of an OADT. As noted above, an OADT 
would preempt state laws such as net metering laws. Yet, it would also have 
to preserve the historic role of the states to address such matters as setting 
terms and conditions for financial soundness of industry participants and licensing 
of new entrants. 
b. Risks in Relying on the Model 
One obvious risk of drawing any fundamental lessons from the financial 
system regulatory reform model is that, as noted above, sweeping regulatory 
change in the financial system is often crisis-driven. This aspect of resonance 
between the two models makes the finance model somewhat less appealing as 
a foundation for legal change to establish a smart electricity network. No one 
seeks a crisis. If fundamental change in the electric grid is more appealing to 
the public because a crisis has taken place,298 we can imagine worst-case scenarios 
far more damaging than those that have take place so far: blackouts over wide 
geographic areas, terrorist attacks on centralized generation facilities, and so 
294. See Barkow, supra note 246, at 75. 
295. Id at 75-76. 
296. Compare Elosta, supra note 247, at 1275 (discussing "dynamic federalism" in the institutional 
landscape of the CFPB), with Eisen, supra note 4, at 53 (discussing the dynamic approach of 
standard-setting for the Smart Grid that avoids disruptive jurisdictional clashes between 
federal agencies and state PUCs). 
297. Elosta, supra note 247, at 1275. 
298. See Cass R. Sunstein, On The Divergent American Reactions to Terrorism and Climate Change, 
107 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 556 (2007) ("If the public's analysis of likely costs and benefits 
shifted, perhaps as a result of more vivid incidents of tangible harm, domestic controls on 
greenhouse gases, and American participation in international agreements, would be far more 
probable."). 
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forth. The warning signs are clear: The current electric grid faces constant 
stress and is desperately in need of an overhaul, and like crumbling bridges on 
highways, is a candidate for systemic failure. Perhaps the most useful aspect 
of the finance model, then, is that we should not-and cannot-wait for this 
sort of disastrous event on the electric grid to prompt change. 
Another unappealing aspect of the crisis-driven reforms in the financial 
sector model is that it is hardly apparent that a crisis would yield the desired 
public policy result. Indeed, just the opposite may be true. The problems that 
Dodd-Frank sought to address (for example, with the CFPB's creation) of 
"overlapping jurisdictions" and "gaps in oversight'' in the regulatory infrastructure 
for financial services resulted from piecemeal development of a structure that 
evolved over decades, "largely in reaction to past financial crises, with new 
agencies and rules created to address the perceived causes of the particular finan-
cial problems at that time."299 This suggests that even the reforms promised 
by Dodd-Frank will require time to evaluate and may require additional tink-
ering. In other areas of the law (for example, environmental law300), shaping 
law reactively rather than proactively can often make it difficult to select the 
appropriate policy prescription. For now, we do not know whether this will be 
case with the CFPB, but we muststaytunedforCFPB II. 
CONCLUSION 
Using an OADT to accelerate development of a smart electricity network 
would foster disruption of the current electric grid and could prompt a "dumb 
to smart" evolution similar to that of the telecommunications industry: the 
transformation of America's one-way electric grid with digital technologies 
and revolutionary consumer applications. At present, there are only small 
movements toward discussion of a network with the central characteristic of 
openness and facilitation of multidimensional seamless transactions. Early-stage 
policy changes are encouraging innovative products, but no technology has 
comprehensively displaced the existing one. As one article puts it, "New market 
entrants are beginning to deliver familiar services in new ways and a host of 
299. WEBELET AL.,supranote25l, at Summary. 
300. See, e.g., Lincoln L. Davies, Alternative Energy and the Energy-Environment Disconnect, 46 
IDAHO L. REV. 473, 493 (2010) ("Energy and environmental law are both reactive. They 
focus more on the end result than the starting cause."); Robert V. Percival, Who's Afraid efthe 
Precautionary Principle?, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 21, 22 (2006) ('While precaution has long 
been an important aspiration of much of United States environmental law, in practice, 
regulatory policy generally has been reactive, rather than truly precautionary."). 
1770 61 UCLA L. REV.1712 (2014) 
new technologies and capital solutions are waiting in the wings to supply 
growing demand for next generation products and services."301 
On numerous fronts, potentially disruptive technologies for the elec-
tricity system are being developed, deployed, and tested. It looks more likely 
than ever that a critical mass of technologies may emerge to eventually 
prompt the need for a network. Some policies (more transmission connected 
to renewables via Order 1000, for example)302 look like the prototypes for 
open networks, but true network development is not taking place. Infrastruc-
ture and standards are evolving, yet there is no overriding consideration of a 
principle of open access.303 Implementing an OADT to provide this openness 
would require fundamental transformation of this heavily regulated industry. 
For one thing, it is by no means clear that utilities will accept competition 
through opening their distribution wires. Looking forward to the future, 
there is an increasingly pervasive fear on the part of utilities that, sooner ra-
ther than later, consumers with applications like rooftop solar and storage 
systems will bypass utilities for their electricity needs. In time, that might 
prompt utilities to discuss openness, similar to what took place in the tele-
communications sector. 
What is past is most assuredly prologue. Learning from three different 
models of transformative regulatory change in major industries suggests im-
portant lessons about near-term regulatory needs for open access and about 
market conditions that may make open access appropriate. In the electric 
grid, if FERC issued an OADT too soon or without state PUC cooperation, 
it risks serious backlash from entities that have a role in creating a smart elec-
tricity network. Yet if it waits too long, the preconditions may never be estab-
lished. Rather than wait for a transformation and then grapple with the 
difficulties of establishing an open access principle, this Article recognizes 
that decades of preparatory work are necessary to set a foundation for open 
access, and then issue an OADT to establish full open access. 
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